DECEPTICON: How Dark Patterns Manipulate Web Agents
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2025
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| _version_ | 1866910013839114240 |
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| author | Cuvin, Phil Zhu, Hao Yang, Diyi |
| author_facet | Cuvin, Phil Zhu, Hao Yang, Diyi |
| contents | Deceptive UI designs, widely instantiated across the web and commonly known as dark patterns, manipulate users into performing actions misaligned with their goals. In this paper, we show that dark patterns are highly effective in steering agent trajectories, posing a significant risk to agent robustness. To quantify this risk, we introduce DECEPTICON, an environment for testing individual dark patterns in isolation. DECEPTICON includes 700 web navigation tasks with dark patterns -- 600 generated tasks and 100 real-world tasks, designed to measure instruction-following success and dark pattern effectiveness. Across state-of-the-art agents, we find dark patterns successfully steer agent trajectories towards malicious outcomes in over 70% of tested generated and real-world tasks -- compared to a human average of 31%. Moreover, we find that dark pattern effectiveness correlates positively with model size and test-time reasoning, making larger, more capable models more susceptible. Leading countermeasures against adversarial attacks, including in-context prompting and guardrail models, fail to consistently reduce the success rate of dark pattern interventions. Our findings reveal dark patterns as a latent and unmitigated risk to web agents, highlighting the urgent need for robust defenses against manipulative designs. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_22894 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | DECEPTICON: How Dark Patterns Manipulate Web Agents Cuvin, Phil Zhu, Hao Yang, Diyi Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Deceptive UI designs, widely instantiated across the web and commonly known as dark patterns, manipulate users into performing actions misaligned with their goals. In this paper, we show that dark patterns are highly effective in steering agent trajectories, posing a significant risk to agent robustness. To quantify this risk, we introduce DECEPTICON, an environment for testing individual dark patterns in isolation. DECEPTICON includes 700 web navigation tasks with dark patterns -- 600 generated tasks and 100 real-world tasks, designed to measure instruction-following success and dark pattern effectiveness. Across state-of-the-art agents, we find dark patterns successfully steer agent trajectories towards malicious outcomes in over 70% of tested generated and real-world tasks -- compared to a human average of 31%. Moreover, we find that dark pattern effectiveness correlates positively with model size and test-time reasoning, making larger, more capable models more susceptible. Leading countermeasures against adversarial attacks, including in-context prompting and guardrail models, fail to consistently reduce the success rate of dark pattern interventions. Our findings reveal dark patterns as a latent and unmitigated risk to web agents, highlighting the urgent need for robust defenses against manipulative designs. |
| title | DECEPTICON: How Dark Patterns Manipulate Web Agents |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.22894 |