Multi-Agent Framework for Threat Mitigation and Resilience in AI-Based Systems

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Main Authors: Foundjem, Armstrong, Tidjon, Lionel Nganyewou, Da Silva, Leuson, Khomh, Foutse
Format: Preprint
Published: 2025
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author Foundjem, Armstrong
Tidjon, Lionel Nganyewou
Da Silva, Leuson
Khomh, Foutse
author_facet Foundjem, Armstrong
Tidjon, Lionel Nganyewou
Da Silva, Leuson
Khomh, Foutse
contents Machine learning (ML) underpins foundation models in finance, healthcare, and critical infrastructure, making them targets for data poisoning, model extraction, prompt injection, automated jailbreaking, and preference-guided black-box attacks that exploit model comparisons. Larger models can be more vulnerable to introspection-driven jailbreaks and cross-modal manipulation. Traditional cybersecurity lacks ML-specific threat modeling for foundation, multimodal, and RAG systems. Objective: Characterize ML security risks by identifying dominant TTPs, vulnerabilities, and targeted lifecycle stages. Methods: We extract 93 threats from MITRE ATLAS (26), AI Incident Database (12), and literature (55), and analyze 854 GitHub/Python repositories. A multi-agent RAG system (ChatGPT-4o, temp 0.4) mines 300+ articles to build an ontology-driven threat graph linking TTPs, vulnerabilities, and stages. Results: We identify unreported threats including commercial LLM API model stealing, parameter memorization leakage, and preference-guided text-only jailbreaks. Dominant TTPs include MASTERKEY-style jailbreaking, federated poisoning, diffusion backdoors, and preference optimization leakage, mainly impacting pre-training and inference. Graph analysis reveals dense vulnerability clusters in libraries with poor patch propagation. Conclusion: Adaptive, ML-specific security frameworks, combining dependency hygiene, threat intelligence, and monitoring, are essential to mitigate supply-chain and inference risks across the ML lifecycle.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2512_23132
institution arXiv
publishDate 2025
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Multi-Agent Framework for Threat Mitigation and Resilience in AI-Based Systems
Foundjem, Armstrong
Tidjon, Lionel Nganyewou
Da Silva, Leuson
Khomh, Foutse
Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
Multiagent Systems
Machine learning (ML) underpins foundation models in finance, healthcare, and critical infrastructure, making them targets for data poisoning, model extraction, prompt injection, automated jailbreaking, and preference-guided black-box attacks that exploit model comparisons. Larger models can be more vulnerable to introspection-driven jailbreaks and cross-modal manipulation. Traditional cybersecurity lacks ML-specific threat modeling for foundation, multimodal, and RAG systems. Objective: Characterize ML security risks by identifying dominant TTPs, vulnerabilities, and targeted lifecycle stages. Methods: We extract 93 threats from MITRE ATLAS (26), AI Incident Database (12), and literature (55), and analyze 854 GitHub/Python repositories. A multi-agent RAG system (ChatGPT-4o, temp 0.4) mines 300+ articles to build an ontology-driven threat graph linking TTPs, vulnerabilities, and stages. Results: We identify unreported threats including commercial LLM API model stealing, parameter memorization leakage, and preference-guided text-only jailbreaks. Dominant TTPs include MASTERKEY-style jailbreaking, federated poisoning, diffusion backdoors, and preference optimization leakage, mainly impacting pre-training and inference. Graph analysis reveals dense vulnerability clusters in libraries with poor patch propagation. Conclusion: Adaptive, ML-specific security frameworks, combining dependency hygiene, threat intelligence, and monitoring, are essential to mitigate supply-chain and inference risks across the ML lifecycle.
title Multi-Agent Framework for Threat Mitigation and Resilience in AI-Based Systems
topic Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
Multiagent Systems
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.23132