Modeling Epidemic Dynamics of Mutant Strains with Evolutionary Game-based Vaccination Behavior

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: Zhang, Wenjie, Li, Yusheng, Li, Qin, Huang, Guojun, Feng, Minyu
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2026
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author Zhang, Wenjie
Li, Yusheng
Li, Qin
Huang, Guojun
Feng, Minyu
author_facet Zhang, Wenjie
Li, Yusheng
Li, Qin
Huang, Guojun
Feng, Minyu
contents The outbreak of mutant strains and vaccination behaviors have been the focus of recent epidemiological research, but most existing epidemic models failed to simultaneously capture viral mutation and consider the complexity and behavioral dynamics of vaccination. To address this gap, we develop an extended SIRS model that distinguishes infections with the original strain and a mutant strain, and explicitly introduces a vaccinated compartment state. At the behavioral level, we employ evolutionary game theory to model individual vaccination decisions, where strategies are determined by both neighbors' choices and the current epidemiological situation. This process corresponds to the time-varying vaccination rate of susceptible individuals transitioning to vaccinated individuals at the epidemic spreading level. We then couple the epidemic and vaccination behavioral processes through the microscopic Markov chain approach (MMCA) and finally investigate the evolutionary dynamics via numerical simulations. The results show that our framework can effectively mitigate outbreaks across different disease scenarios. Sensitivity analysis further reveals that vaccination uptake is most strongly influenced by vaccine cost, efficacy, and perceived risk of side effects. Overall, this behavior-aware modeling framework captures the co-evolution of viral mutation and vaccination behavior, providing quantitative and theoretical support for designing effective public health vaccination policies.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_00757
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Modeling Epidemic Dynamics of Mutant Strains with Evolutionary Game-based Vaccination Behavior
Zhang, Wenjie
Li, Yusheng
Li, Qin
Huang, Guojun
Feng, Minyu
Populations and Evolution
Social and Information Networks
Physics and Society
The outbreak of mutant strains and vaccination behaviors have been the focus of recent epidemiological research, but most existing epidemic models failed to simultaneously capture viral mutation and consider the complexity and behavioral dynamics of vaccination. To address this gap, we develop an extended SIRS model that distinguishes infections with the original strain and a mutant strain, and explicitly introduces a vaccinated compartment state. At the behavioral level, we employ evolutionary game theory to model individual vaccination decisions, where strategies are determined by both neighbors' choices and the current epidemiological situation. This process corresponds to the time-varying vaccination rate of susceptible individuals transitioning to vaccinated individuals at the epidemic spreading level. We then couple the epidemic and vaccination behavioral processes through the microscopic Markov chain approach (MMCA) and finally investigate the evolutionary dynamics via numerical simulations. The results show that our framework can effectively mitigate outbreaks across different disease scenarios. Sensitivity analysis further reveals that vaccination uptake is most strongly influenced by vaccine cost, efficacy, and perceived risk of side effects. Overall, this behavior-aware modeling framework captures the co-evolution of viral mutation and vaccination behavior, providing quantitative and theoretical support for designing effective public health vaccination policies.
title Modeling Epidemic Dynamics of Mutant Strains with Evolutionary Game-based Vaccination Behavior
topic Populations and Evolution
Social and Information Networks
Physics and Society
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.00757