Strategic Expression, Popularity Traps, and Welfare in Social Media
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866915825366073344 |
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| author | Kanik, Zafer Hakobyan, Zaruhi |
| author_facet | Kanik, Zafer Hakobyan, Zaruhi |
| contents | Social media platforms systematically reward popularity over authenticity, incentivizing users to strategically tailor their expression for attention. In this paper, we introduce (i) popularity as a strategic expression mechanism, distinct from the canonical mechanisms of conformity, learning, persuasion, and (mis)information transmission in social networks, and (ii) a utilitarian framework for measuring user welfare that maps directly to observable platform metrics, filling a critical gap in the social media literature. In the model, agents hold fixed heterogeneous authentic opinions and derive utility gains from the popularity of their own posts -- measured by likes received, and utility gains (losses) from exposure to content that aligns with (diverges from) their authentic opinion. Social media interaction acts as a state-dependent welfare amplifier: light topics generate Pareto improvements, whereas intense topics make everyone worse off in a polarized society (e.g., political debates during elections). Moreover, strategic expression amplifies social media polarization during polarized events while dampening it during unified events (e.g., national celebrations). Consequently, strategic distortions magnify welfare outcomes, expanding aggregate gains in light topics while exacerbating losses in intense, polarized ones. Counterintuitively, strategic agents often face a popularity trap: posting a more popular opinion is individually optimal, yet collective action by similar agents eliminates their authentic opinion from the platform, leaving them worse off than under the authentic-expression benchmark. Homophilic algorithms that match users with preferred content -- widely used by platforms -- discipline popularity-driven behavior, narrowing the popularity trap region and limiting its welfare effects. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_01370 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Strategic Expression, Popularity Traps, and Welfare in Social Media Kanik, Zafer Hakobyan, Zaruhi General Economics Economics Social and Information Networks Social media platforms systematically reward popularity over authenticity, incentivizing users to strategically tailor their expression for attention. In this paper, we introduce (i) popularity as a strategic expression mechanism, distinct from the canonical mechanisms of conformity, learning, persuasion, and (mis)information transmission in social networks, and (ii) a utilitarian framework for measuring user welfare that maps directly to observable platform metrics, filling a critical gap in the social media literature. In the model, agents hold fixed heterogeneous authentic opinions and derive utility gains from the popularity of their own posts -- measured by likes received, and utility gains (losses) from exposure to content that aligns with (diverges from) their authentic opinion. Social media interaction acts as a state-dependent welfare amplifier: light topics generate Pareto improvements, whereas intense topics make everyone worse off in a polarized society (e.g., political debates during elections). Moreover, strategic expression amplifies social media polarization during polarized events while dampening it during unified events (e.g., national celebrations). Consequently, strategic distortions magnify welfare outcomes, expanding aggregate gains in light topics while exacerbating losses in intense, polarized ones. Counterintuitively, strategic agents often face a popularity trap: posting a more popular opinion is individually optimal, yet collective action by similar agents eliminates their authentic opinion from the platform, leaving them worse off than under the authentic-expression benchmark. Homophilic algorithms that match users with preferred content -- widely used by platforms -- discipline popularity-driven behavior, narrowing the popularity trap region and limiting its welfare effects. |
| title | Strategic Expression, Popularity Traps, and Welfare in Social Media |
| topic | General Economics Economics Social and Information Networks |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.01370 |