How Real is Your Jailbreak? Fine-grained Jailbreak Evaluation with Anchored Reference

Fuente: arXiv
Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Liu, Songyang, Li, Chaozhuo, Pu, Rui, Zhang, Litian, Wang, Chenxu, Chen, Zejian, Zhang, Yuting, Hei, Yiming
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2026
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
_version_ 1866911357511663616
author Liu, Songyang
Li, Chaozhuo
Pu, Rui
Zhang, Litian
Wang, Chenxu
Chen, Zejian
Zhang, Yuting
Hei, Yiming
author_facet Liu, Songyang
Li, Chaozhuo
Pu, Rui
Zhang, Litian
Wang, Chenxu
Chen, Zejian
Zhang, Yuting
Hei, Yiming
contents Jailbreak attacks present a significant challenge to the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs), yet current automated evaluation methods largely rely on coarse classifications that focus mainly on harmfulness, leading to substantial overestimation of attack success. To address this problem, we propose FJAR, a fine-grained jailbreak evaluation framework with anchored references. We first categorized jailbreak responses into five fine-grained categories: Rejective, Irrelevant, Unhelpful, Incorrect, and Successful, based on the degree to which the response addresses the malicious intent of the query. This categorization serves as the basis for FJAR. Then, we introduce a novel harmless tree decomposition approach to construct high-quality anchored references by breaking down the original queries. These references guide the evaluator in determining whether the response genuinely fulfills the original query. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FJAR achieves the highest alignment with human judgment and effectively identifies the root causes of jailbreak failures, providing actionable guidance for improving attack strategies.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_03288
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle How Real is Your Jailbreak? Fine-grained Jailbreak Evaluation with Anchored Reference
Liu, Songyang
Li, Chaozhuo
Pu, Rui
Zhang, Litian
Wang, Chenxu
Chen, Zejian
Zhang, Yuting
Hei, Yiming
Cryptography and Security
Computation and Language
Jailbreak attacks present a significant challenge to the safety of Large Language Models (LLMs), yet current automated evaluation methods largely rely on coarse classifications that focus mainly on harmfulness, leading to substantial overestimation of attack success. To address this problem, we propose FJAR, a fine-grained jailbreak evaluation framework with anchored references. We first categorized jailbreak responses into five fine-grained categories: Rejective, Irrelevant, Unhelpful, Incorrect, and Successful, based on the degree to which the response addresses the malicious intent of the query. This categorization serves as the basis for FJAR. Then, we introduce a novel harmless tree decomposition approach to construct high-quality anchored references by breaking down the original queries. These references guide the evaluator in determining whether the response genuinely fulfills the original query. Extensive experiments demonstrate that FJAR achieves the highest alignment with human judgment and effectively identifies the root causes of jailbreak failures, providing actionable guidance for improving attack strategies.
title How Real is Your Jailbreak? Fine-grained Jailbreak Evaluation with Anchored Reference
topic Cryptography and Security
Computation and Language
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.03288