$PC^2$: Politically Controversial Content Generation via Jailbreaking Attacks on GPT-based Text-to-Image Models
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866918530787573760 |
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| author | Choi, Wonwoo Seo, Minjae Song, Minkyoo Heo, Hwanjo Shin, Seungwon You, Myoungsung |
| author_facet | Choi, Wonwoo Seo, Minjae Song, Minkyoo Heo, Hwanjo Shin, Seungwon You, Myoungsung |
| contents | The rapid evolution of text-to-image (T2I) models has enabled high-fidelity visual synthesis on a global scale. However, these advancements have introduced significant security risks, particularly regarding the generation of harmful content. Politically harmful content, such as fabricated depictions of public figures, poses severe threats when weaponized for fake news or propaganda. Despite its criticality, the robustness of current T2I safety filters against such politically motivated adversarial prompting remains underexplored. In response, we propose $PC^2$, the first black-box political jailbreaking framework for T2I models. It exploits a novel vulnerability where safety filters evaluate political sensitivity based on linguistic context. $PC^2$ operates through: (1) Identity-Preserving Descriptive Mapping to obfuscate sensitive keywords into neutral descriptions, and (2) Geopolitically Distal Translation to map these descriptions into fragmented, low-sensitivity languages. This strategy prevents filters from constructing toxic relationships between political entities within prompts, effectively bypassing detection. We construct a benchmark of 240 politically sensitive prompts involving 36 public figures. Evaluation on commercial T2I models, specifically the GPT series, shows that while all original prompts are blocked, $PC^2$ achieves attack success rates (ASRs) of up to 86% and outperforms state-of-the-art frameworks by a large margin. We further propose a ready-to-deploy multi-layered filtering mitigation against $PC^2$-style attacks, reducing ASR to approximately 10%. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_05150 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | $PC^2$: Politically Controversial Content Generation via Jailbreaking Attacks on GPT-based Text-to-Image Models Choi, Wonwoo Seo, Minjae Song, Minkyoo Heo, Hwanjo Shin, Seungwon You, Myoungsung Cryptography and Security The rapid evolution of text-to-image (T2I) models has enabled high-fidelity visual synthesis on a global scale. However, these advancements have introduced significant security risks, particularly regarding the generation of harmful content. Politically harmful content, such as fabricated depictions of public figures, poses severe threats when weaponized for fake news or propaganda. Despite its criticality, the robustness of current T2I safety filters against such politically motivated adversarial prompting remains underexplored. In response, we propose $PC^2$, the first black-box political jailbreaking framework for T2I models. It exploits a novel vulnerability where safety filters evaluate political sensitivity based on linguistic context. $PC^2$ operates through: (1) Identity-Preserving Descriptive Mapping to obfuscate sensitive keywords into neutral descriptions, and (2) Geopolitically Distal Translation to map these descriptions into fragmented, low-sensitivity languages. This strategy prevents filters from constructing toxic relationships between political entities within prompts, effectively bypassing detection. We construct a benchmark of 240 politically sensitive prompts involving 36 public figures. Evaluation on commercial T2I models, specifically the GPT series, shows that while all original prompts are blocked, $PC^2$ achieves attack success rates (ASRs) of up to 86% and outperforms state-of-the-art frameworks by a large margin. We further propose a ready-to-deploy multi-layered filtering mitigation against $PC^2$-style attacks, reducing ASR to approximately 10%. |
| title | $PC^2$: Politically Controversial Content Generation via Jailbreaking Attacks on GPT-based Text-to-Image Models |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.05150 |