Jailbreaking Large Language Models through Iterative Tool-Disguised Attacks via Reinforcement Learning
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866912810846388224 |
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| author | Wang, Zhaoqi Zhang, Zijian He, Daqing Kou, Pengtao Li, Xin Liu, Jiamou An, Jincheng Liu, Yong |
| author_facet | Wang, Zhaoqi Zhang, Zijian He, Daqing Kou, Pengtao Li, Xin Liu, Jiamou An, Jincheng Liu, Yong |
| contents | Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across diverse applications, however, they remain critically vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that elicit harmful responses violating human values and safety guidelines. Despite extensive research on defense mechanisms, existing safeguards prove insufficient against sophisticated adversarial strategies. In this work, we propose iMIST (\underline{i}nteractive \underline{M}ulti-step \underline{P}rogre\underline{s}sive \underline{T}ool-disguised Jailbreak Attack), a novel adaptive jailbreak method that synergistically exploits vulnerabilities in current defense mechanisms. iMIST disguises malicious queries as normal tool invocations to bypass content filters, while simultaneously introducing an interactive progressive optimization algorithm that dynamically escalates response harmfulness through multi-turn dialogues guided by real-time harmfulness assessment. Our experiments on widely-used models demonstrate that iMIST achieves higher attack effectiveness, while maintaining low rejection rates. These results reveal critical vulnerabilities in current LLM safety mechanisms and underscore the urgent need for more robust defense strategies. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_05466 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Jailbreaking Large Language Models through Iterative Tool-Disguised Attacks via Reinforcement Learning Wang, Zhaoqi Zhang, Zijian He, Daqing Kou, Pengtao Li, Xin Liu, Jiamou An, Jincheng Liu, Yong Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across diverse applications, however, they remain critically vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that elicit harmful responses violating human values and safety guidelines. Despite extensive research on defense mechanisms, existing safeguards prove insufficient against sophisticated adversarial strategies. In this work, we propose iMIST (\underline{i}nteractive \underline{M}ulti-step \underline{P}rogre\underline{s}sive \underline{T}ool-disguised Jailbreak Attack), a novel adaptive jailbreak method that synergistically exploits vulnerabilities in current defense mechanisms. iMIST disguises malicious queries as normal tool invocations to bypass content filters, while simultaneously introducing an interactive progressive optimization algorithm that dynamically escalates response harmfulness through multi-turn dialogues guided by real-time harmfulness assessment. Our experiments on widely-used models demonstrate that iMIST achieves higher attack effectiveness, while maintaining low rejection rates. These results reveal critical vulnerabilities in current LLM safety mechanisms and underscore the urgent need for more robust defense strategies. |
| title | Jailbreaking Large Language Models through Iterative Tool-Disguised Attacks via Reinforcement Learning |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Artificial Intelligence |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.05466 |