The Axiom of Consent: Friction Dynamics in Multi-Agent Coordination
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| author | Farzulla, Murad |
| author_facet | Farzulla, Murad |
| contents | Multi-agent systems face a fundamental coordination problem: agents must coordinate despite heterogeneous preferences, asymmetric stakes, and imperfect information. When coordination fails, friction emerges: measurable resistance manifesting as deadlock, thrashing, communication overhead, or outright conflict. This paper derives a formal framework for analyzing coordination friction from a single axiom: actions affecting agents require authorization from those agents in proportion to stakes.
From this axiom of consent, we establish the kernel triple $(α, σ, ε)$ (alignment, stake, and entropy) characterizing any resource allocation configuration. The friction equation $F = σ (1 + ε)/(1 + α)$ predicts coordination difficulty as a function of preference alignment $α$, stake magnitude $σ$, and communication entropy $ε$. The Replicator-Optimization Mechanism (ROM) governs evolutionary selection over coordination strategies: configurations generating less friction persist longer, establishing consent-respecting arrangements as dynamical attractors rather than normative ideals.
We develop formal definitions for resource consent, coordination legitimacy, and friction-aware allocation in multi-agent systems. The framework yields testable predictions: MARL systems with higher reward alignment exhibit faster convergence; distributed allocations accounting for stake asymmetry generate lower coordination failure; AI systems with interpretability deficits produce friction proportional to the human-AI alignment gap. Applications to cryptocurrency governance and political systems demonstrate that the same equations govern friction dynamics across domains, providing a complexity science perspective on coordination under preference heterogeneity. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_06692 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | The Axiom of Consent: Friction Dynamics in Multi-Agent Coordination Farzulla, Murad Multiagent Systems Computers and Society 68T42 (Primary) 91A22, 91A80 (Secondary) I.2.11; J.4; I.2.6 Multi-agent systems face a fundamental coordination problem: agents must coordinate despite heterogeneous preferences, asymmetric stakes, and imperfect information. When coordination fails, friction emerges: measurable resistance manifesting as deadlock, thrashing, communication overhead, or outright conflict. This paper derives a formal framework for analyzing coordination friction from a single axiom: actions affecting agents require authorization from those agents in proportion to stakes. From this axiom of consent, we establish the kernel triple $(α, σ, ε)$ (alignment, stake, and entropy) characterizing any resource allocation configuration. The friction equation $F = σ (1 + ε)/(1 + α)$ predicts coordination difficulty as a function of preference alignment $α$, stake magnitude $σ$, and communication entropy $ε$. The Replicator-Optimization Mechanism (ROM) governs evolutionary selection over coordination strategies: configurations generating less friction persist longer, establishing consent-respecting arrangements as dynamical attractors rather than normative ideals. We develop formal definitions for resource consent, coordination legitimacy, and friction-aware allocation in multi-agent systems. The framework yields testable predictions: MARL systems with higher reward alignment exhibit faster convergence; distributed allocations accounting for stake asymmetry generate lower coordination failure; AI systems with interpretability deficits produce friction proportional to the human-AI alignment gap. Applications to cryptocurrency governance and political systems demonstrate that the same equations govern friction dynamics across domains, providing a complexity science perspective on coordination under preference heterogeneity. |
| title | The Axiom of Consent: Friction Dynamics in Multi-Agent Coordination |
| topic | Multiagent Systems Computers and Society 68T42 (Primary) 91A22, 91A80 (Secondary) I.2.11; J.4; I.2.6 |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.06692 |