Simple Power Analysis of Polynomial Multiplication in HQC
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866915723536760832 |
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| author | Velek, Pavel Rabas, Tomáš Buček, Jiří |
| author_facet | Velek, Pavel Rabas, Tomáš Buček, Jiří |
| contents | The Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) cryptosystem was selected for standardization in the fourth round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization project. The goal of the PQC project is to standardize one or more quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we present a single-trace Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack against HQC that exploits power consumption leakage that occurs during polynomial multiplication performed at the beginning of HQC decryption. Using the ChipWhisperer-Lite board, we perform and evaluate the attack, achieving a 99.69% success rate over 10 000 attack attempts. We also propose various countermeasures against the attack and evaluate their time complexity. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_07634 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Simple Power Analysis of Polynomial Multiplication in HQC Velek, Pavel Rabas, Tomáš Buček, Jiří Cryptography and Security The Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) cryptosystem was selected for standardization in the fourth round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization project. The goal of the PQC project is to standardize one or more quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we present a single-trace Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack against HQC that exploits power consumption leakage that occurs during polynomial multiplication performed at the beginning of HQC decryption. Using the ChipWhisperer-Lite board, we perform and evaluate the attack, achieving a 99.69% success rate over 10 000 attack attempts. We also propose various countermeasures against the attack and evaluate their time complexity. |
| title | Simple Power Analysis of Polynomial Multiplication in HQC |
| topic | Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.07634 |