Credible Nash Bargaining Solution for Bilateral Trading Networks

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Rong, Kang, Tang, Qianfeng
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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author Rong, Kang
Tang, Qianfeng
author_facet Rong, Kang
Tang, Qianfeng
contents We study surplus division in network constrained bilateral matching markets with transferable utility. We introduce a new solution concept, the credible bargaining solution, which refines stability by requiring that, for each matched pair of buyer and seller, surplus be divided according to the Nash bargaining solution with respect to credible outside options, defined as their payoffs in some stable outcome of the submarket obtained by removing their link. We establish general properties of the credible bargaining solution, prove existence, and provide a complete characterization in the unit-surplus case based on the notion of essential links.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_09198
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Credible Nash Bargaining Solution for Bilateral Trading Networks
Rong, Kang
Tang, Qianfeng
Theoretical Economics
We study surplus division in network constrained bilateral matching markets with transferable utility. We introduce a new solution concept, the credible bargaining solution, which refines stability by requiring that, for each matched pair of buyer and seller, surplus be divided according to the Nash bargaining solution with respect to credible outside options, defined as their payoffs in some stable outcome of the submarket obtained by removing their link. We establish general properties of the credible bargaining solution, prove existence, and provide a complete characterization in the unit-surplus case based on the notion of essential links.
title Credible Nash Bargaining Solution for Bilateral Trading Networks
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.09198