Minimizing the Cost of EFx Allocations
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866911380331823104 |
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| author | Deltl, Eva |
| author_facet | Deltl, Eva |
| contents | Ensuring fairness while limiting costs, such as transportation or storage, is an important challenge in resource allocation, yet most work has focused on cost minimization without fairness or fairness without explicit cost considerations. We introduce and formally define the minCost-EFx Allocation problem, where the objective is to compute an allocation that is envy-free up to any item (EFx) and has minimum cost. We investigate the algorithmic complexity of this problem, proving that it is NP-hard already with two agents. On the positive side, we show that the problem admits a polynomial kernel with respect to the number of items, implying that a core source of intractability lies in the number of items. Building on this, we identify parameter-restricted settings that are tractable, including cases with bounded valuations and a constant number of agents, or a limited number of item types under restricted cost models. Finally, we turn to cost approximation, proving that for any $ρ>1$ the problem is not $ρ$-approximable in polynomial time (unless $P=NP$), while also identifying restricted cost models where costs are agent-specific and independent of the actual items received, which admit better approximation guarantees. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_11372 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Minimizing the Cost of EFx Allocations Deltl, Eva Computer Science and Game Theory Computational Complexity Ensuring fairness while limiting costs, such as transportation or storage, is an important challenge in resource allocation, yet most work has focused on cost minimization without fairness or fairness without explicit cost considerations. We introduce and formally define the minCost-EFx Allocation problem, where the objective is to compute an allocation that is envy-free up to any item (EFx) and has minimum cost. We investigate the algorithmic complexity of this problem, proving that it is NP-hard already with two agents. On the positive side, we show that the problem admits a polynomial kernel with respect to the number of items, implying that a core source of intractability lies in the number of items. Building on this, we identify parameter-restricted settings that are tractable, including cases with bounded valuations and a constant number of agents, or a limited number of item types under restricted cost models. Finally, we turn to cost approximation, proving that for any $ρ>1$ the problem is not $ρ$-approximable in polynomial time (unless $P=NP$), while also identifying restricted cost models where costs are agent-specific and independent of the actual items received, which admit better approximation guarantees. |
| title | Minimizing the Cost of EFx Allocations |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory Computational Complexity |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.11372 |