Evolutionary vaccination dynamics under higher-order reinforcement pressure
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866915737010962432 |
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| author | Lu, Yikang Wang, Ying de Miguel-Arribas, Alfonso Shi, Lei Moreno, Yamir |
| author_facet | Lu, Yikang Wang, Ying de Miguel-Arribas, Alfonso Shi, Lei Moreno, Yamir |
| contents | Vaccination games in higher-order settings remain underexplored, despite their importance in shaping opinions and collective decisions. Here, we introduce a parsimonious behavioral-epidemiological model to evaluate how peer reinforcement pressure influences vaccination uptake. The framework consists of a two-layer multiplex: an epidemic layer governed by the SIR process on a square lattice, and a behavioral layer represented by a hypergraph of triadic interactions. Individuals update their vaccination strategy via imitation, modulated by a reinforcement parameter $α$ when peer support is present. We find that higher-order structure alone induces clusters of vaccinated individuals that act as protective barriers. Low but nonzero reinforcement ($α\approx 0.5$) maximizes coverage and suppresses outbreaks, while both negligible ($α\approx 0$) and moderate ($α> 0.1$) reinforcement reduce uptake, as excessive confirmation lowers adaptability and enables non-vaccinators to re-emerge. Our work bridges complex contagion theory with evolutionary game dynamics, offering insights into how contact structure and peer reinforcement jointly shape vaccination behavior. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_12114 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Evolutionary vaccination dynamics under higher-order reinforcement pressure Lu, Yikang Wang, Ying de Miguel-Arribas, Alfonso Shi, Lei Moreno, Yamir Physics and Society Vaccination games in higher-order settings remain underexplored, despite their importance in shaping opinions and collective decisions. Here, we introduce a parsimonious behavioral-epidemiological model to evaluate how peer reinforcement pressure influences vaccination uptake. The framework consists of a two-layer multiplex: an epidemic layer governed by the SIR process on a square lattice, and a behavioral layer represented by a hypergraph of triadic interactions. Individuals update their vaccination strategy via imitation, modulated by a reinforcement parameter $α$ when peer support is present. We find that higher-order structure alone induces clusters of vaccinated individuals that act as protective barriers. Low but nonzero reinforcement ($α\approx 0.5$) maximizes coverage and suppresses outbreaks, while both negligible ($α\approx 0$) and moderate ($α> 0.1$) reinforcement reduce uptake, as excessive confirmation lowers adaptability and enables non-vaccinators to re-emerge. Our work bridges complex contagion theory with evolutionary game dynamics, offering insights into how contact structure and peer reinforcement jointly shape vaccination behavior. |
| title | Evolutionary vaccination dynamics under higher-order reinforcement pressure |
| topic | Physics and Society |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.12114 |