Towards Simple and Useful One-Time Programs in the Quantum Random Oracle Model
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866914392308711424 |
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| author | Stambler, Lev |
| author_facet | Stambler, Lev |
| contents | We construct simulation-secure one-time memories (OTM) in the random oracle model, and present a plausible argument for their security against quantum adversaries with bounded and adaptive depth. Our contributions include: (1) A simple scheme where we use only single-qubit Wiesner states and conjunction obfuscation (constructible from LPN): no complex entanglement or quantum cryptography is required. (2) A new POVM bound where e prove that any measurement achieving $(1 - ε)$ success on one basis has conjugate-basis guessing probability at most $\frac{1}{2m} + O(ε^\frac{1}{4})$. (3) Simultation-secure OTMs in the quantum random oracle model where an adversary can only query the random oracle classically. (4) Adaptive depth security where, via an informal application of a lifting theorem from Arora et al., we conjecture security against adversaries with polynomial quantum circuit depth between random oracle queries.
Security against adaptive, depth-bounded, quantum adversaries captures many realistic attacks on OTMs built from single-qubit states; our work thus paves the way for practical and truly secure one-time programs. Moreover, depth bounded adaptive adversarial models may allow for encoding one-time memories into error corrected memory states, opening the door to implementations of one-time programs which persist for long periods of time. |
| format | Preprint |
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arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_13258 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Towards Simple and Useful One-Time Programs in the Quantum Random Oracle Model Stambler, Lev Quantum Physics Cryptography and Security We construct simulation-secure one-time memories (OTM) in the random oracle model, and present a plausible argument for their security against quantum adversaries with bounded and adaptive depth. Our contributions include: (1) A simple scheme where we use only single-qubit Wiesner states and conjunction obfuscation (constructible from LPN): no complex entanglement or quantum cryptography is required. (2) A new POVM bound where e prove that any measurement achieving $(1 - ε)$ success on one basis has conjugate-basis guessing probability at most $\frac{1}{2m} + O(ε^\frac{1}{4})$. (3) Simultation-secure OTMs in the quantum random oracle model where an adversary can only query the random oracle classically. (4) Adaptive depth security where, via an informal application of a lifting theorem from Arora et al., we conjecture security against adversaries with polynomial quantum circuit depth between random oracle queries. Security against adaptive, depth-bounded, quantum adversaries captures many realistic attacks on OTMs built from single-qubit states; our work thus paves the way for practical and truly secure one-time programs. Moreover, depth bounded adaptive adversarial models may allow for encoding one-time memories into error corrected memory states, opening the door to implementations of one-time programs which persist for long periods of time. |
| title | Towards Simple and Useful One-Time Programs in the Quantum Random Oracle Model |
| topic | Quantum Physics Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.13258 |