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Bridging the Gap Between Estimated and True Regret Towards Reliable Regret Estimation in Deep Learning based Mechanism Design

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	You, Shuyuan, Zhuang, Zhiqiang, Wang, Kewen, Wang, Zhe
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2026
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory Machine Learning General Economics Economics
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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