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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.13571 |
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| _version_ | 1866911387004960768 |
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| author | Zhang, Yongqi Ngoduy, Dong Duan, Li Zhu, Mingchang Chen, Zhuo |
| author_facet | Zhang, Yongqi Ngoduy, Dong Duan, Li Zhu, Mingchang Chen, Zhuo |
| contents | The rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) introduces complex spatiotemporal demand management challenges for charging station operators (CSOs), exacerbated by demand imbalances, behavioral heterogeneity, and system uncertainty. Traditional dynamic pricing models, often relying on deterministic EV-CS pairings and network equilibrium assumptions, frequently oversimplify user behavior and lack scalability. This study proposes a stochastic, behaviorally heterogeneous dynamic pricing framework formulated as a bi-level Stackelberg game. The upper level optimizes time-varying pricing to maximize system-wide utility, while the lower level models decentralized EV users via a multinomial logit (MNL) choice model incorporating price sensitivity, battery aging, risk attitudes, and network travel costs. Crucially, the model avoids network equilibrium constraints to enhance scalability, with congestion effects represented via queuing-theoretic approximations. To efficiently solve the resulting large-scale optimization problem, a rolling-horizon approach combining the Dynamic Probabilistic Sensitivity Analysis-guided Cross-Entropy Method (PSA-CEM) with the Method of Successive Averages (MSA) is implemented. A real-world case study in Clayton, Melbourne, validates the framework using 22 charging stations. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism substantially reduces queuing penalties and improves user utility compared to fixed and time-of-use pricing. The framework provides a robust, scalable tool for strategic EV charging management, balancing realism with computational efficiency. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_13571 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Stochastic Dynamic Pricing of Electric Vehicle Charging with Heterogeneous User Behavior: A Stackelberg Game Framework Zhang, Yongqi Ngoduy, Dong Duan, Li Zhu, Mingchang Chen, Zhuo Computer Science and Game Theory The rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) introduces complex spatiotemporal demand management challenges for charging station operators (CSOs), exacerbated by demand imbalances, behavioral heterogeneity, and system uncertainty. Traditional dynamic pricing models, often relying on deterministic EV-CS pairings and network equilibrium assumptions, frequently oversimplify user behavior and lack scalability. This study proposes a stochastic, behaviorally heterogeneous dynamic pricing framework formulated as a bi-level Stackelberg game. The upper level optimizes time-varying pricing to maximize system-wide utility, while the lower level models decentralized EV users via a multinomial logit (MNL) choice model incorporating price sensitivity, battery aging, risk attitudes, and network travel costs. Crucially, the model avoids network equilibrium constraints to enhance scalability, with congestion effects represented via queuing-theoretic approximations. To efficiently solve the resulting large-scale optimization problem, a rolling-horizon approach combining the Dynamic Probabilistic Sensitivity Analysis-guided Cross-Entropy Method (PSA-CEM) with the Method of Successive Averages (MSA) is implemented. A real-world case study in Clayton, Melbourne, validates the framework using 22 charging stations. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism substantially reduces queuing penalties and improves user utility compared to fixed and time-of-use pricing. The framework provides a robust, scalable tool for strategic EV charging management, balancing realism with computational efficiency. |
| title | Stochastic Dynamic Pricing of Electric Vehicle Charging with Heterogeneous User Behavior: A Stackelberg Game Framework |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.13571 |