When Backdoors Meet Partial Observability: Attacking Real-World Reinforcement Learning
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arXiv
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| Autori principali: | , , , , , , |
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866917487729180672 |
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| author | Huang, Tairan Ye, Qingqing Jin, Yulin Lian, Jiawei Xiao, Yaxin Wang, Yi Hu, Haibo |
| author_facet | Huang, Tairan Ye, Qingqing Jin, Yulin Lian, Jiawei Xiao, Yaxin Wang, Yi Hu, Haibo |
| contents | Backdoor attacks can cause reinforcement learning (RL) policies to behave normally under clean inputs while executing malicious behaviors when triggers are present. Existing RL backdoor attacks are primarily studied in simulation and often assume that attackers can reliably manipulate the observations driving policy decisions. This assumption becomes fragile in real-world deployment, where RL policies commonly rely on multimodal observations. Attackers can manipulate visual inputs through physical triggers, but auxiliary states such as LiDAR and odometry signals remain uncontrollable and vary across trajectories. We study this overlooked challenge and propose a diffusion-guided backdoor attack framework (DGBA) for real-world RL. DGBA uses small printable visual patches as triggers and learns a stochastic trigger distribution via conditional diffusion to maintain consistent attack activation under varying uncontrollable states. We further introduce an advantage-based poisoning strategy that injects triggers only at decision-critical training states. Experiments on a physical TurtleBot3 platform show that DGBA consistently outperforms prior RL backdoor attacks while preserving normal task performance. Demo videos and code are available in the supplementary material. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_14104 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | When Backdoors Meet Partial Observability: Attacking Real-World Reinforcement Learning Huang, Tairan Ye, Qingqing Jin, Yulin Lian, Jiawei Xiao, Yaxin Wang, Yi Hu, Haibo Robotics Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Backdoor attacks can cause reinforcement learning (RL) policies to behave normally under clean inputs while executing malicious behaviors when triggers are present. Existing RL backdoor attacks are primarily studied in simulation and often assume that attackers can reliably manipulate the observations driving policy decisions. This assumption becomes fragile in real-world deployment, where RL policies commonly rely on multimodal observations. Attackers can manipulate visual inputs through physical triggers, but auxiliary states such as LiDAR and odometry signals remain uncontrollable and vary across trajectories. We study this overlooked challenge and propose a diffusion-guided backdoor attack framework (DGBA) for real-world RL. DGBA uses small printable visual patches as triggers and learns a stochastic trigger distribution via conditional diffusion to maintain consistent attack activation under varying uncontrollable states. We further introduce an advantage-based poisoning strategy that injects triggers only at decision-critical training states. Experiments on a physical TurtleBot3 platform show that DGBA consistently outperforms prior RL backdoor attacks while preserving normal task performance. Demo videos and code are available in the supplementary material. |
| title | When Backdoors Meet Partial Observability: Attacking Real-World Reinforcement Learning |
| topic | Robotics Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.14104 |