An Empirical Study on Remote Code Execution in Machine Learning Model Hosting Ecosystems
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
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2026
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| _version_ | 1866914266538311680 |
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| author | Siddiq, Mohammed Latif Romel, Tanzim Hossain Sekerak, Natalie Casey, Beatrice Santos, Joanna C. S. |
| author_facet | Siddiq, Mohammed Latif Romel, Tanzim Hossain Sekerak, Natalie Casey, Beatrice Santos, Joanna C. S. |
| contents | Model-sharing platforms, such as Hugging Face, ModelScope, and OpenCSG, have become central to modern machine learning development, enabling developers to share, load, and fine-tune pre-trained models with minimal effort. However, the flexibility of these ecosystems introduces a critical security concern: the execution of untrusted code during model loading (i.e., via trust_remote_code or trust_repo). In this work, we conduct the first large-scale empirical study of custom model loading practices across five major model-sharing platforms to assess their prevalence, associated risks, and developer perceptions. We first quantify the frequency with which models require custom code to function and identify those that execute arbitrary Python files during loading. We then apply three complementary static analysis tools: Bandit, CodeQL, and Semgrep, to detect security smells and potential vulnerabilities, categorizing our findings by CWE identifiers to provide a standardized risk taxonomy. We also use YARA to identify malicious patterns and payload signatures. In parallel, we systematically analyze the documentation, API design, and safety mechanisms of each platform to understand their mitigation strategies and enforcement levels. Finally, we conduct a qualitative analysis of over 600 developer discussions from GitHub, Hugging Face, and PyTorch Hub forums, as well as Stack Overflow, to capture community concerns and misconceptions regarding security and usability. Our findings reveal widespread reliance on unsafe defaults, uneven security enforcement across platforms, and persistent confusion among developers about the implications of executing remote code. We conclude with actionable recommendations for designing safer model-sharing infrastructures and striking a balance between usability and security in future AI ecosystems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_14163 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | An Empirical Study on Remote Code Execution in Machine Learning Model Hosting Ecosystems Siddiq, Mohammed Latif Romel, Tanzim Hossain Sekerak, Natalie Casey, Beatrice Santos, Joanna C. S. Software Engineering Cryptography and Security Model-sharing platforms, such as Hugging Face, ModelScope, and OpenCSG, have become central to modern machine learning development, enabling developers to share, load, and fine-tune pre-trained models with minimal effort. However, the flexibility of these ecosystems introduces a critical security concern: the execution of untrusted code during model loading (i.e., via trust_remote_code or trust_repo). In this work, we conduct the first large-scale empirical study of custom model loading practices across five major model-sharing platforms to assess their prevalence, associated risks, and developer perceptions. We first quantify the frequency with which models require custom code to function and identify those that execute arbitrary Python files during loading. We then apply three complementary static analysis tools: Bandit, CodeQL, and Semgrep, to detect security smells and potential vulnerabilities, categorizing our findings by CWE identifiers to provide a standardized risk taxonomy. We also use YARA to identify malicious patterns and payload signatures. In parallel, we systematically analyze the documentation, API design, and safety mechanisms of each platform to understand their mitigation strategies and enforcement levels. Finally, we conduct a qualitative analysis of over 600 developer discussions from GitHub, Hugging Face, and PyTorch Hub forums, as well as Stack Overflow, to capture community concerns and misconceptions regarding security and usability. Our findings reveal widespread reliance on unsafe defaults, uneven security enforcement across platforms, and persistent confusion among developers about the implications of executing remote code. We conclude with actionable recommendations for designing safer model-sharing infrastructures and striking a balance between usability and security in future AI ecosystems. |
| title | An Empirical Study on Remote Code Execution in Machine Learning Model Hosting Ecosystems |
| topic | Software Engineering Cryptography and Security |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.14163 |