The Algorithmic Barrier: Quantifying Artificial Frictional Unemployment in Automated Recruitment Systems

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Author: Fofanah, Ibrahim Denis
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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author Fofanah, Ibrahim Denis
author_facet Fofanah, Ibrahim Denis
contents The United States labor market exhibits a persistent coexistence of high job vacancy rates and prolonged unemployment duration, a pattern that standard labor market theory struggles to explain. This paper argues that a non-trivial portion of contemporary frictional unemployment is artificially induced by automated recruitment systems that rely on deterministic keyword-based screening. Drawing on labor economics, information asymmetry theory, and prior work on algorithmic hiring, we formalize this phenomenon as artificial frictional unemployment arising from semantic misinterpretation of candidate competencies. We evaluate this claim using controlled simulations that compare legacy keyword-based screening with semantic matching based on high-dimensional vector representations of resumes and job descriptions. The results demonstrate substantial improvements in recall and overall matching efficiency without a corresponding loss in precision. Building on these findings, the paper proposes a candidate-side workforce operating architecture that standardizes, verifies, and semantically aligns human capital signals while remaining interoperable with existing recruitment infrastructure. The findings highlight the economic costs of outdated hiring systems and the potential gains from improving semantic alignment in labor market matching.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_14534
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle The Algorithmic Barrier: Quantifying Artificial Frictional Unemployment in Automated Recruitment Systems
Fofanah, Ibrahim Denis
Computers and Society
General Economics
Economics
Probability
F.2.2; H.3.3; I.2.7
The United States labor market exhibits a persistent coexistence of high job vacancy rates and prolonged unemployment duration, a pattern that standard labor market theory struggles to explain. This paper argues that a non-trivial portion of contemporary frictional unemployment is artificially induced by automated recruitment systems that rely on deterministic keyword-based screening. Drawing on labor economics, information asymmetry theory, and prior work on algorithmic hiring, we formalize this phenomenon as artificial frictional unemployment arising from semantic misinterpretation of candidate competencies. We evaluate this claim using controlled simulations that compare legacy keyword-based screening with semantic matching based on high-dimensional vector representations of resumes and job descriptions. The results demonstrate substantial improvements in recall and overall matching efficiency without a corresponding loss in precision. Building on these findings, the paper proposes a candidate-side workforce operating architecture that standardizes, verifies, and semantically aligns human capital signals while remaining interoperable with existing recruitment infrastructure. The findings highlight the economic costs of outdated hiring systems and the potential gains from improving semantic alignment in labor market matching.
title The Algorithmic Barrier: Quantifying Artificial Frictional Unemployment in Automated Recruitment Systems
topic Computers and Society
General Economics
Economics
Probability
F.2.2; H.3.3; I.2.7
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.14534