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Do people expect different behavior from large language models acting on their behalf? Evidence from norm elicitations in two canonical economic games

Fuente: arXiv

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Dettagli Bibliografici
Autori principali:	Niszczota, Paweł, Antoniou, Elia
Natura:	Preprint
Pubblicazione:	2026
Soggetti:	Computer Science and Game Theory Artificial Intelligence Computation and Language Computers and Society Human-Computer Interaction General Economics Economics 91A80, 91B42, 91B10 I.2.7; J.4; K.4.2
Accesso online:	Acceder al recurso
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