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Equal-Pay Contracts

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Feldman, Michal, Gal-Tzur, Yoav, Ponitka, Tomasz, Schlesinger, Maya
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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