Average Unfairness in Routing Games

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Su, Pan-Yang, Alanqary, Arwa, Ferguson, Bryce L., Wu, Manxi, Bayen, Alexandre M., Sastry, Shankar
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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author Su, Pan-Yang
Alanqary, Arwa
Ferguson, Bryce L.
Wu, Manxi
Bayen, Alexandre M.
Sastry, Shankar
author_facet Su, Pan-Yang
Alanqary, Arwa
Ferguson, Bryce L.
Wu, Manxi
Bayen, Alexandre M.
Sastry, Shankar
contents We propose average unfairness as a new measure of fairness in routing games, defined as the ratio between the average latency and the minimum latency experienced by users. This measure is a natural complement to two existing unfairness notions: loaded unfairness, which compares maximum and minimum latencies of routes with positive flow, and user equilibrium (UE) unfairness, which compares maximum latency with the latency of a Nash equilibrium. We show that the worst-case values of all three unfairness measures coincide and are characterized by a steepness parameter intrinsic to the latency function class. We show that average unfairness is always no greater than loaded unfairness, and the two measures are equal only when the flow is fully fair. Besides that, we offer a complete comparison of the three unfairness measures, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first theoretical analysis in this direction. Finally, we study the constrained system optimum (CSO) problem, where one seeks to minimize total latency subject to an upper bound on unfairness. We prove that, for the same tolerance level, the optimal flow under an average unfairness constraint achieves lower total latency than any flow satisfying a loaded unfairness constraint. We show that such improvement is always strict in parallel-link networks and establish sufficient conditions for general networks. We further illustrate the latter with numerical examples. Our results provide theoretical guarantees and valuable insights for evaluating fairness-efficiency tradeoffs in network routing.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_16187
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Average Unfairness in Routing Games
Su, Pan-Yang
Alanqary, Arwa
Ferguson, Bryce L.
Wu, Manxi
Bayen, Alexandre M.
Sastry, Shankar
Multiagent Systems
Computer Science and Game Theory
Systems and Control
91A14, 90B20
We propose average unfairness as a new measure of fairness in routing games, defined as the ratio between the average latency and the minimum latency experienced by users. This measure is a natural complement to two existing unfairness notions: loaded unfairness, which compares maximum and minimum latencies of routes with positive flow, and user equilibrium (UE) unfairness, which compares maximum latency with the latency of a Nash equilibrium. We show that the worst-case values of all three unfairness measures coincide and are characterized by a steepness parameter intrinsic to the latency function class. We show that average unfairness is always no greater than loaded unfairness, and the two measures are equal only when the flow is fully fair. Besides that, we offer a complete comparison of the three unfairness measures, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first theoretical analysis in this direction. Finally, we study the constrained system optimum (CSO) problem, where one seeks to minimize total latency subject to an upper bound on unfairness. We prove that, for the same tolerance level, the optimal flow under an average unfairness constraint achieves lower total latency than any flow satisfying a loaded unfairness constraint. We show that such improvement is always strict in parallel-link networks and establish sufficient conditions for general networks. We further illustrate the latter with numerical examples. Our results provide theoretical guarantees and valuable insights for evaluating fairness-efficiency tradeoffs in network routing.
title Average Unfairness in Routing Games
topic Multiagent Systems
Computer Science and Game Theory
Systems and Control
91A14, 90B20
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.16187