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Main Authors:	Garcia, Margaret, Deslatte, Aaron, Koebele, Elizabeth A., Hornberger, George, Anderies, John M., Vicario, Sara Alonso, Azizi, Koorosh, Barnes, Jesse, Wiechman, Adam
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.17147
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