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Information Design and Mechanism Design: An Integrated Framework

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Bergemann, Dirk, Heumann, Tibor, Morris, Stephen
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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