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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.17538 |
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| _version_ | 1866918307469197312 |
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| author | Han, Qishen Ivaniuk, Artem Elkind, Edith Xia, Lirong |
| author_facet | Han, Qishen Ivaniuk, Artem Elkind, Edith Xia, Lirong |
| contents | Participatory Budgeting (PB) is commonly studied from an axiomatic perspective, where the aim is to design procedurally fair and economically efficient rules for voters with full information regarding their preferences. In contrast, we take an epistemic perspective and consider a framework where PB projects have different levels of underlying quality, indicating how well the project will take effect, which cannot be directly observed before implementation. Agents with noisy information cast votes to aggregate their information, and aim to elect a high-quality set of projects. We evaluate the performance of common PB rules by measuring the expected utility of their outcomes, compared to the optimal set of projects. We find that the quality of approximation improves as the range of project costs shrinks. When projects have unit cost, these common rules can identify the ``best'' set with probability converging to 1. We also study whether strategic agents have incentives to honestly convey their information in the vote. We find that it happens only under very restrictive conditions. We also run numerical experiments to examine the performance of different rules empirically and support our theoretical findings. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_17538 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Truth-Revealing Participatory Budgeting Han, Qishen Ivaniuk, Artem Elkind, Edith Xia, Lirong Computer Science and Game Theory Participatory Budgeting (PB) is commonly studied from an axiomatic perspective, where the aim is to design procedurally fair and economically efficient rules for voters with full information regarding their preferences. In contrast, we take an epistemic perspective and consider a framework where PB projects have different levels of underlying quality, indicating how well the project will take effect, which cannot be directly observed before implementation. Agents with noisy information cast votes to aggregate their information, and aim to elect a high-quality set of projects. We evaluate the performance of common PB rules by measuring the expected utility of their outcomes, compared to the optimal set of projects. We find that the quality of approximation improves as the range of project costs shrinks. When projects have unit cost, these common rules can identify the ``best'' set with probability converging to 1. We also study whether strategic agents have incentives to honestly convey their information in the vote. We find that it happens only under very restrictive conditions. We also run numerical experiments to examine the performance of different rules empirically and support our theoretical findings. |
| title | Truth-Revealing Participatory Budgeting |
| topic | Computer Science and Game Theory |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.17538 |