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Truth-Revealing Participatory Budgeting

Fuente: arXiv

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteurs principaux:	Han, Qishen, Ivaniuk, Artem, Elkind, Edith, Xia, Lirong
Format:	Preprint
Publié:	2026
Sujets:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Accès en ligne:	Acceder al recurso
Tags:	Ajouter un tag Pas de tags, Soyez le premier à ajouter un tag!

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