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Dynamic Mechanism Design without Monetary Transfers: A Queueing Theory Approach

Fuente: arXiv

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Li, Zihao, Chen, Xuandong
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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