Noise as a Probe: Membership Inference Attacks on Diffusion Models Leveraging Initial Noise

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Lian, Puwei, Cai, Yujun, Li, Songze, Bao, Bingkun
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2026
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author Lian, Puwei
Cai, Yujun
Li, Songze
Bao, Bingkun
author_facet Lian, Puwei
Cai, Yujun
Li, Songze
Bao, Bingkun
contents Diffusion models have achieved remarkable progress in image generation, but their increasing deployment raises serious concerns about privacy. In particular, fine-tuned models are highly vulnerable, as they are often fine-tuned on small and private datasets. Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are used to assess privacy risks by determining whether a specific sample was part of a model's training data. Existing MIAs against diffusion models either assume obtaining the intermediate results or require auxiliary datasets for training the shadow model. In this work, we utilized a critical yet overlooked vulnerability: the widely used noise schedules fail to fully eliminate semantic information in the images, resulting in residual semantic signals even at the maximum noise step. We empirically demonstrate that the fine-tuned diffusion model captures hidden correlations between the residual semantics in initial noise and the original images. Building on this insight, we propose a simple yet effective membership inference attack, which injects semantic information into the initial noise and infers membership by analyzing the model's generation result. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the semantic initial noise can strongly reveal membership information, highlighting the vulnerability of diffusion models to MIAs.
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id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2601_21628
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publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Noise as a Probe: Membership Inference Attacks on Diffusion Models Leveraging Initial Noise
Lian, Puwei
Cai, Yujun
Li, Songze
Bao, Bingkun
Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
Diffusion models have achieved remarkable progress in image generation, but their increasing deployment raises serious concerns about privacy. In particular, fine-tuned models are highly vulnerable, as they are often fine-tuned on small and private datasets. Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are used to assess privacy risks by determining whether a specific sample was part of a model's training data. Existing MIAs against diffusion models either assume obtaining the intermediate results or require auxiliary datasets for training the shadow model. In this work, we utilized a critical yet overlooked vulnerability: the widely used noise schedules fail to fully eliminate semantic information in the images, resulting in residual semantic signals even at the maximum noise step. We empirically demonstrate that the fine-tuned diffusion model captures hidden correlations between the residual semantics in initial noise and the original images. Building on this insight, we propose a simple yet effective membership inference attack, which injects semantic information into the initial noise and infers membership by analyzing the model's generation result. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the semantic initial noise can strongly reveal membership information, highlighting the vulnerability of diffusion models to MIAs.
title Noise as a Probe: Membership Inference Attacks on Diffusion Models Leveraging Initial Noise
topic Cryptography and Security
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2601.21628