Targeting Without Transfers
Fuente:
arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866916041993486336 |
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| author | Tokarski, Filip |
| author_facet | Tokarski, Filip |
| contents | I study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous goods when monetary transfers are prohibited. Agents have private values, and the designer chooses a mechanism subject to incentive compatibility and aggregate supply constraints. I characterize the optimal mechanism for two kinds of goods, and show that it either offers one pure option per good or adds a bundle that delivers a larger total quantity. Including the bundle is optimal when narrow preference margins between goods are sufficiently predictive of greater need, allowing the designer to target high-value agents through their willingness to accept mixing. I then consider the case with N types of goods and characterize when the optimal mechanism takes the form of a simple menu, where each option offers some amount of one kind of good and none of the others. When this is the case, it can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with equal incomes or a choice-based lottery. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_00487 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Targeting Without Transfers Tokarski, Filip Theoretical Economics I study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous goods when monetary transfers are prohibited. Agents have private values, and the designer chooses a mechanism subject to incentive compatibility and aggregate supply constraints. I characterize the optimal mechanism for two kinds of goods, and show that it either offers one pure option per good or adds a bundle that delivers a larger total quantity. Including the bundle is optimal when narrow preference margins between goods are sufficiently predictive of greater need, allowing the designer to target high-value agents through their willingness to accept mixing. I then consider the case with N types of goods and characterize when the optimal mechanism takes the form of a simple menu, where each option offers some amount of one kind of good and none of the others. When this is the case, it can be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with equal incomes or a choice-based lottery. |
| title | Targeting Without Transfers |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.00487 |