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Simple and Robust Quality Disclosure: The Power of Quantile Partition

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Agrawal, Shipra, Feng, Yiding, Tang, Wei
Format:	Preprint
Published:	2026
Subjects:	Computer Science and Game Theory Theoretical Economics
Online Access:	Acceder al recurso
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