From Discrete to Continuous Mixed Populations of Conformists, Nonconformists, and Imitators

Fuente: arXiv
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Aghaeeyan, Azadeh, Ramazi, Pouria
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866914300447162368
author Aghaeeyan, Azadeh
Ramazi, Pouria
author_facet Aghaeeyan, Azadeh
Ramazi, Pouria
contents In two-strategy decision-making problems, individuals often imitate the highest earners or choose either the common or rare strategy. Individuals who benefit from the common strategy are conformists, whereas those who profit by choosing the less common one are called nonconformists. The population proportions of the two strategies may undergo perpetual fluctuations in finite, discrete, heterogeneous populations of imitators, conformists, and nonconformists. How these fluctuations evolve as population size increases was left as an open question and is addressed in this paper. We show that the family of Markov chains describing the discrete population dynamics forms a generalized stochastic approximation process for a differential inclusion--the continuous-time dynamics. Furthermore, we prove that the continuous-time dynamics always equilibrate. Then, by leveraging results from the stochastic approximation theory, we show that the amplitudes of fluctuations in the proportions of the two strategies in the population approach zero with probability one when the population size grows to infinity. Our results suggest that large-scale perpetual fluctuations are unlikely in large, well-mixed populations consisting of these three types, particularly when imitators follow the highest earners.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_01492
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle From Discrete to Continuous Mixed Populations of Conformists, Nonconformists, and Imitators
Aghaeeyan, Azadeh
Ramazi, Pouria
Populations and Evolution
Systems and Control
In two-strategy decision-making problems, individuals often imitate the highest earners or choose either the common or rare strategy. Individuals who benefit from the common strategy are conformists, whereas those who profit by choosing the less common one are called nonconformists. The population proportions of the two strategies may undergo perpetual fluctuations in finite, discrete, heterogeneous populations of imitators, conformists, and nonconformists. How these fluctuations evolve as population size increases was left as an open question and is addressed in this paper. We show that the family of Markov chains describing the discrete population dynamics forms a generalized stochastic approximation process for a differential inclusion--the continuous-time dynamics. Furthermore, we prove that the continuous-time dynamics always equilibrate. Then, by leveraging results from the stochastic approximation theory, we show that the amplitudes of fluctuations in the proportions of the two strategies in the population approach zero with probability one when the population size grows to infinity. Our results suggest that large-scale perpetual fluctuations are unlikely in large, well-mixed populations consisting of these three types, particularly when imitators follow the highest earners.
title From Discrete to Continuous Mixed Populations of Conformists, Nonconformists, and Imitators
topic Populations and Evolution
Systems and Control
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.01492