When Is Generalized Bayes Bayesian? A Decision-Theoretic Characterization of Loss-Based Updating

Fuente: arXiv
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Autores principales: McAlinn, Kenichiro, Takanashi, Kōsaku
Formato: Preprint
Publicado: 2026
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author McAlinn, Kenichiro
Takanashi, Kōsaku
author_facet McAlinn, Kenichiro
Takanashi, Kōsaku
contents Loss-based updating, including generalized Bayes, Gibbs, and quasi-posteriors, replaces likelihoods by a user-chosen loss and produces a posterior-like distribution via exponential tilt. We give a decision-theoretic characterization that separates \emph{belief posteriors} -- conditional beliefs justified by the foundations of Savage and Anscombe-Aumann under a joint probability mode l-- from \emph{decision posteriors} -- randomized decision rules justified by preferences over decision rules. We make explicit that a loss-based posterior coincides with ordinary Bayes if and only if the loss is, up to scale and a data-only term, negative log-likelihood. We then show that generalized marginal likelihood is not evidence for decision posteriors, and Bayes factors are not well-defined without additional structure. In the decision posterior regime, non-degenerate posteriors require nonlinear preferences over decision rules. Under sequential coherence and separability, these lead to an entropy-penalized variational representation yielding generalized Bayes as the optimal rule.
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publishDate 2026
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spellingShingle When Is Generalized Bayes Bayesian? A Decision-Theoretic Characterization of Loss-Based Updating
McAlinn, Kenichiro
Takanashi, Kōsaku
Methodology
Machine Learning
Loss-based updating, including generalized Bayes, Gibbs, and quasi-posteriors, replaces likelihoods by a user-chosen loss and produces a posterior-like distribution via exponential tilt. We give a decision-theoretic characterization that separates \emph{belief posteriors} -- conditional beliefs justified by the foundations of Savage and Anscombe-Aumann under a joint probability mode l-- from \emph{decision posteriors} -- randomized decision rules justified by preferences over decision rules. We make explicit that a loss-based posterior coincides with ordinary Bayes if and only if the loss is, up to scale and a data-only term, negative log-likelihood. We then show that generalized marginal likelihood is not evidence for decision posteriors, and Bayes factors are not well-defined without additional structure. In the decision posterior regime, non-degenerate posteriors require nonlinear preferences over decision rules. Under sequential coherence and separability, these lead to an entropy-penalized variational representation yielding generalized Bayes as the optimal rule.
title When Is Generalized Bayes Bayesian? A Decision-Theoretic Characterization of Loss-Based Updating
topic Methodology
Machine Learning
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.01573