Beyond Hurwicz: Incentive Compatibility under Informational Decentralization
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866917241422872576 |
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| author | Lancashire, David |
| author_facet | Lancashire, David |
| contents | Achieving incentive compatibility under informational decentralization is impossible within the class of direct and revelation-equivalent mechanisms typically studied in economics and computer science. We show that these impossibility results are conditional by identifying a narrow class of non-revelation-equivalent mechanisms that sustain enforcement by inferring preferences indirectly through parallel, uncorrelatable games. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_01790 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Beyond Hurwicz: Incentive Compatibility under Informational Decentralization Lancashire, David Theoretical Economics Achieving incentive compatibility under informational decentralization is impossible within the class of direct and revelation-equivalent mechanisms typically studied in economics and computer science. We show that these impossibility results are conditional by identifying a narrow class of non-revelation-equivalent mechanisms that sustain enforcement by inferring preferences indirectly through parallel, uncorrelatable games. |
| title | Beyond Hurwicz: Incentive Compatibility under Informational Decentralization |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.01790 |