The relationship between R&D spillovers and regional innovation: Licensing patents through royalties and the Stackelberg duopoly with subgame perfect Nash equilibrium

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1. Verfasser: Kanellopoulos, Vasilios
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2026
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author Kanellopoulos, Vasilios
author_facet Kanellopoulos, Vasilios
contents The present paper examines the effect of R&D spillovers on regional innovation in Greece over the 2002-2010 period. The approach taken goes beyond a regional knowledge production function and draws possible explanations from a more extensive pool of R&D related and regional structural variables. Having employed game theory techniques in order to describe the licensing of the patents through royalties and derived the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under a Stackelberg duopoly, the results obtained accord with findings of previous studies when it comes R&D expenditure related variables and further suggest that the role of highly-qualified employment is instrumental in promoting regional innovation. The results also suggest the benefits of synergies between R&D personnel in manufacturing and other measures of highly-qualified employment as well as R&D expenditure of the public sector and employment in manufacturing business R&D for regional innovation.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_02274
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle The relationship between R&D spillovers and regional innovation: Licensing patents through royalties and the Stackelberg duopoly with subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
Kanellopoulos, Vasilios
Theoretical Economics
The present paper examines the effect of R&D spillovers on regional innovation in Greece over the 2002-2010 period. The approach taken goes beyond a regional knowledge production function and draws possible explanations from a more extensive pool of R&D related and regional structural variables. Having employed game theory techniques in order to describe the licensing of the patents through royalties and derived the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under a Stackelberg duopoly, the results obtained accord with findings of previous studies when it comes R&D expenditure related variables and further suggest that the role of highly-qualified employment is instrumental in promoting regional innovation. The results also suggest the benefits of synergies between R&D personnel in manufacturing and other measures of highly-qualified employment as well as R&D expenditure of the public sector and employment in manufacturing business R&D for regional innovation.
title The relationship between R&D spillovers and regional innovation: Licensing patents through royalties and the Stackelberg duopoly with subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
topic Theoretical Economics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.02274