Reward Shaping for Inference-Time Alignment: A Stackelberg Game Perspective

Fuente: arXiv
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Autori principali: Wang, Haichuan, Lin, Tao, Kong, Lingkai, Li, Ce, Jiang, Hezi, Tambe, Milind
Natura: Preprint
Pubblicazione: 2026
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author Wang, Haichuan
Lin, Tao
Kong, Lingkai
Li, Ce
Jiang, Hezi
Tambe, Milind
author_facet Wang, Haichuan
Lin, Tao
Kong, Lingkai
Li, Ce
Jiang, Hezi
Tambe, Milind
contents Existing alignment methods directly use the reward model learned from user preference data to optimize an LLM policy, subject to KL regularization with respect to the base policy. This practice is suboptimal for maximizing user's utility because the KL regularization may cause the LLM to inherit the bias in the base policy that conflicts with user preferences. While amplifying rewards for preferred outputs can mitigate this bias, it also increases the risk of reward hacking. This tradeoff motivates the problem of optimally designing reward models under KL regularization. We formalize this reward model optimization problem as a Stackelberg game, and show that a simple reward shaping scheme can effectively approximate the optimal reward model. We empirically evaluate our method in inference-time alignment settings and demonstrate that it integrates seamlessly into existing alignment methods with minimal overhead. Our method consistently improves average reward and achieves win-tie rates exceeding 66% against all baselines, averaged across evaluation settings.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_02572
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Reward Shaping for Inference-Time Alignment: A Stackelberg Game Perspective
Wang, Haichuan
Lin, Tao
Kong, Lingkai
Li, Ce
Jiang, Hezi
Tambe, Milind
Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
Existing alignment methods directly use the reward model learned from user preference data to optimize an LLM policy, subject to KL regularization with respect to the base policy. This practice is suboptimal for maximizing user's utility because the KL regularization may cause the LLM to inherit the bias in the base policy that conflicts with user preferences. While amplifying rewards for preferred outputs can mitigate this bias, it also increases the risk of reward hacking. This tradeoff motivates the problem of optimally designing reward models under KL regularization. We formalize this reward model optimization problem as a Stackelberg game, and show that a simple reward shaping scheme can effectively approximate the optimal reward model. We empirically evaluate our method in inference-time alignment settings and demonstrate that it integrates seamlessly into existing alignment methods with minimal overhead. Our method consistently improves average reward and achieves win-tie rates exceeding 66% against all baselines, averaged across evaluation settings.
title Reward Shaping for Inference-Time Alignment: A Stackelberg Game Perspective
topic Machine Learning
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.02572