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| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.02819 |
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| _version_ | 1866913177361448960 |
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| author | Even, Mathieu Berenfeld, Clément Bleistein, Linus Cebere, Tudor Josse, Julie Bellet, Aurélien |
| author_facet | Even, Mathieu Berenfeld, Clément Bleistein, Linus Cebere, Tudor Josse, Julie Bellet, Aurélien |
| contents | Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) aim to distinguish training points (members) from unseen data (non-members), and are widely used to quantify memorization and assess privacy risks. Standard MIA evaluation requires repeated retraining, which is computationally costly for large models. One-run (single training with randomized data inclusion) and zero-run (post hoc evaluation) methods are often used instead, but their statistical validity remains unclear. We address this gap by framing MIA evaluation as a causal inference problem, defining \emph{memorization as the causal effect of including a data point in the training set}. This novel formulation reveals and formalizes key sources of bias in existing protocols: one-run methods suffer from interference between jointly included points, while zero-run evaluations are additionally confounded by distribution shift between member and non-member evaluation data. We derive causal analogues of standard MIA metrics and propose practical estimators for multi-run, one-run, and zero-run regimes with non-asymptotic consistency guarantees. We validate our approach in several settings, including pretrained and fine-tuned LLMs, showing that it enables reliable measurement of MIA performance without retraining and under distribution shift. Overall, our framework provides a principled foundation for privacy evaluation in modern AI systems. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_02819 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Causal Evaluation of Membership Inference Attacks Even, Mathieu Berenfeld, Clément Bleistein, Linus Cebere, Tudor Josse, Julie Bellet, Aurélien Machine Learning Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) aim to distinguish training points (members) from unseen data (non-members), and are widely used to quantify memorization and assess privacy risks. Standard MIA evaluation requires repeated retraining, which is computationally costly for large models. One-run (single training with randomized data inclusion) and zero-run (post hoc evaluation) methods are often used instead, but their statistical validity remains unclear. We address this gap by framing MIA evaluation as a causal inference problem, defining \emph{memorization as the causal effect of including a data point in the training set}. This novel formulation reveals and formalizes key sources of bias in existing protocols: one-run methods suffer from interference between jointly included points, while zero-run evaluations are additionally confounded by distribution shift between member and non-member evaluation data. We derive causal analogues of standard MIA metrics and propose practical estimators for multi-run, one-run, and zero-run regimes with non-asymptotic consistency guarantees. We validate our approach in several settings, including pretrained and fine-tuned LLMs, showing that it enables reliable measurement of MIA performance without retraining and under distribution shift. Overall, our framework provides a principled foundation for privacy evaluation in modern AI systems. |
| title | Causal Evaluation of Membership Inference Attacks |
| topic | Machine Learning |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.02819 |