Imagen de Portada

Sequential Linear Contracts on Matroids

Fuente: arXiv

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Pashkovich, Kanstantsin, Skitsko, Jacob, Xing, Yun
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2026
Materias:	Computer Science and Game Theory
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

Ejemplares similares

Linear Contracts for Supermodular Functions Based on Graphs
por: Pashkovich, Kanstantsin, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Non-Adaptive Prophet Inequalities for Minor-Closed Classes of Matroids
por: Pashkovich, Kanstantsin, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Matroid Bayesian Online Selection
por: DeHaan, Ian, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Online Algorithm for Fractional Matchings with Edge Arrivals in Graphs of Maximum Degree Three
por: Pashkovich, Kanstantsin, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Multidimensional Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design
por: Neogi, Rian, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

An $O(\log \log n)$-approximate budget feasible mechanism for subadditive valuations
por: Neogi, Rian, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Contract Design for Sequential Actions
por: Ezra, Tomer, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Distributional Robustness of Linear Contracts
por: Zuo, Shiliang
Publicado: (2026)

Stable Matching under Matroid Rank Valuations
por: Eden, Alon, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Maximum Stable Matching with Matroids and Partial Orders
por: Csáji, Gergely, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Popular Maximum-Utility Matchings with Matroid Constraints
por: Csáji, Gergely, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

The Price of Opportunity Fairness in Matroid Allocation Problems
por: Castera, Rémi, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

The Fairness of Maximum Nash Social Welfare Under Matroid Constraints and Beyond
por: Wang, Yuanyuan, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

A Simplified Analysis of the Ascending Auction to Sell a Matroid Base
por: Peis, Britta, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

The Set of Stable Matchings and the Core in a Matching Market with Ties and Matroid Constraints
por: Kamiyama, Naoyuki
Publicado: (2024)

Matroids are Equitable
por: Akrami, Hannaneh, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty
por: Alon, Tal, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Anonymous Contracts
por: Brustle, Johannes, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Fair Contracts
por: Castiglioni, Matteo, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Ambiguous Contracts
por: Dütting, Paul, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Combinatorial Contracts
por: Duetting, Paul, et al.
Publicado: (2021)

Ultra Efficient Contracts: Pushing the Boundaries of Tractable Contract Design
por: Feldman, Michal, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Online Matroid Embeddings
por: Cristi, Andrés, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Online Contract Design
por: Lavi, Elad, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Equal-Pay Contracts
por: Feldman, Michal, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Multi-Project Contracts
por: Alon, Tal, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Budget-Feasible Contracts
por: Feldman, Michal, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Fair Team Contracts
por: Castiglioni, Matteo, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Multi-Agent Contracts
por: Duetting, Paul, et al.
Publicado: (2022)

Multilevel Fair Allocation with Matroid-Rank Preferences
por: Lucet, Maxime, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Regret Minimization for Piecewise Linear Rewards: Contracts, Auctions, and Beyond
por: Bacchiocchi, Francesco, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts
por: Duetting, Paul, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Contracting with a Mechanism Designer
por: Bai, Tian, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Online Contract Selection for Continual Coverage
por: Chi, Qinge, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Combinatorial Contracts Through Demand Types
por: Baldwin, Elizabeth, et al.
Publicado: (2026)

Welfare and Beyond in Multi-Agent Contracts
por: Aharoni, Gil, et al.
Publicado: (2025)

Contract Design Beyond Hidden-Actions
por: Ezra, Tomer, et al.
Publicado: (2024)

Algorithmic Contract Design for Crowdsourced Ranking
por: Frangias, Kiriaki, et al.
Publicado: (2023)

Unending Sequential Auctions
por: Ban, Amir
Publicado: (2025)

The Power of Information for Intermediate States in Contract Design
por: Zhang, Yirui, et al.
Publicado: (2026)