A brief review of evolutionary game dynamics in the reinforcement learning paradigm

Fuente: arXiv
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Hauptverfasser: Zheng, Guozhong, Ou, Xin, Deng, Shengfeng, Zhang, Jiqiang, Chen, Li
Format: Preprint
Veröffentlicht: 2026
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author Zheng, Guozhong
Ou, Xin
Deng, Shengfeng
Zhang, Jiqiang
Chen, Li
author_facet Zheng, Guozhong
Ou, Xin
Deng, Shengfeng
Zhang, Jiqiang
Chen, Li
contents Cooperation, fairness, trust, and resource coordination are cornerstones of modern civilization, yet their emergence remains inadequately explained by the persistent discrepancies between theoretical predictions and behavioral experiments. Part of this gap may arise from the imitation learning paradigm commonly used in prior theoretical models, which assumes individuals merely copy successful neighbors according to predetermined, fixed rules. This review examines recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics that employ reinforcement learning (RL) as an alternative paradigm. In RL, individuals learn through trial and error and introspectively refine their strategies based on environmental feedback. We begin by introducing key concepts in evolutionary game theory and the two learning paradigms, then synthesize progress in applying RL to elucidate cooperation, trust, fairness, optimal resource coordination, and ecological dynamics. Collectively, these studies indicate that RL offers a promising unified framework for understanding the diverse social and ecological phenomena observed in human and natural systems.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_04150
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle A brief review of evolutionary game dynamics in the reinforcement learning paradigm
Zheng, Guozhong
Ou, Xin
Deng, Shengfeng
Zhang, Jiqiang
Chen, Li
Populations and Evolution
Disordered Systems and Neural Networks
Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems
Cooperation, fairness, trust, and resource coordination are cornerstones of modern civilization, yet their emergence remains inadequately explained by the persistent discrepancies between theoretical predictions and behavioral experiments. Part of this gap may arise from the imitation learning paradigm commonly used in prior theoretical models, which assumes individuals merely copy successful neighbors according to predetermined, fixed rules. This review examines recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics that employ reinforcement learning (RL) as an alternative paradigm. In RL, individuals learn through trial and error and introspectively refine their strategies based on environmental feedback. We begin by introducing key concepts in evolutionary game theory and the two learning paradigms, then synthesize progress in applying RL to elucidate cooperation, trust, fairness, optimal resource coordination, and ecological dynamics. Collectively, these studies indicate that RL offers a promising unified framework for understanding the diverse social and ecological phenomena observed in human and natural systems.
title A brief review of evolutionary game dynamics in the reinforcement learning paradigm
topic Populations and Evolution
Disordered Systems and Neural Networks
Adaptation and Self-Organizing Systems
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.04150