Patch-to-PoC: A Systematic Study of Agentic LLM Systems for Linux Kernel N-Day Reproduction
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866908840313749504 |
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| author | Pu, Juefei Li, Xingyu Liang, Zhengchuan Cox, Jonathan Wu, Yifan Shehada, Kareem Srivastav, Arrdya Qian, Zhiyun |
| author_facet | Pu, Juefei Li, Xingyu Liang, Zhengchuan Cox, Jonathan Wu, Yifan Shehada, Kareem Srivastav, Arrdya Qian, Zhiyun |
| contents | Autonomous large language model (LLM) based systems have recently shown promising results across a range of cybersecurity tasks. However, there is no systematic study on their effectiveness in autonomously reproducing Linux kernel vulnerabilities with concrete proofs-of-concept (PoCs). Owing to the size, complexity, and low-level nature of the Linux kernel, such tasks are widely regarded as particularly challenging for current LLM-based approaches.
In this paper, we present the first large-scale study of LLM-based Linux kernel vulnerability reproduction. For this purpose, we develop K-Repro, an LLM-based agentic system equipped with controlled code-browsing, virtual machine management, interaction, and debugging capabilities. Using kernel security patches as input, K-Repro automates end-to-end bug reproduction of N-day vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel. On a dataset of 100 real-world exploitable Linux kernel vulnerabilities collected from KernelCTF, our results show that K-Repro can generate PoCs that reproduce over 50\% of the cases with practical time and monetary cost.
Beyond aggregate success rates, we perform an extensive study of effectiveness, efficiency, stability, and impact factors to explain when agentic reproduction succeeds, where it fails, and which components drive performance. These findings provide actionable guidance for building more reliable autonomous security agents and for assessing real-world N-day risk from both offensive and defensive perspectives. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_07287 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Patch-to-PoC: A Systematic Study of Agentic LLM Systems for Linux Kernel N-Day Reproduction Pu, Juefei Li, Xingyu Liang, Zhengchuan Cox, Jonathan Wu, Yifan Shehada, Kareem Srivastav, Arrdya Qian, Zhiyun Cryptography and Security Software Engineering Autonomous large language model (LLM) based systems have recently shown promising results across a range of cybersecurity tasks. However, there is no systematic study on their effectiveness in autonomously reproducing Linux kernel vulnerabilities with concrete proofs-of-concept (PoCs). Owing to the size, complexity, and low-level nature of the Linux kernel, such tasks are widely regarded as particularly challenging for current LLM-based approaches. In this paper, we present the first large-scale study of LLM-based Linux kernel vulnerability reproduction. For this purpose, we develop K-Repro, an LLM-based agentic system equipped with controlled code-browsing, virtual machine management, interaction, and debugging capabilities. Using kernel security patches as input, K-Repro automates end-to-end bug reproduction of N-day vulnerabilities in the Linux kernel. On a dataset of 100 real-world exploitable Linux kernel vulnerabilities collected from KernelCTF, our results show that K-Repro can generate PoCs that reproduce over 50\% of the cases with practical time and monetary cost. Beyond aggregate success rates, we perform an extensive study of effectiveness, efficiency, stability, and impact factors to explain when agentic reproduction succeeds, where it fails, and which components drive performance. These findings provide actionable guidance for building more reliable autonomous security agents and for assessing real-world N-day risk from both offensive and defensive perspectives. |
| title | Patch-to-PoC: A Systematic Study of Agentic LLM Systems for Linux Kernel N-Day Reproduction |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Software Engineering |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.07287 |