Distributional Preferences for Market Design
Fuente:
arXiv
Salvato in:
| Autori principali: | , , |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
|
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | |
| Tags: |
Aggiungi Tag
Nessun Tag, puoi essere il primo ad aggiungerne!!
|
| _version_ | 1866918327728734208 |
|---|---|
| author | Echenique, Federico Mekonnen, Teddy Yenmez, M. Bumin |
| author_facet | Echenique, Federico Mekonnen, Teddy Yenmez, M. Bumin |
| contents | We develop a general framework for incorporating distributional preferences in market design. We identify the structural properties of these preferences that guarantee the path independence of choice rules. In decentralized settings, a greedy rule uniquely maximizes these preferences; in centralized markets, the associated deferred-acceptance mechanism uniquely implements them. This framework subsumes canonical models, such as reserves and matroids, while accommodating complex objectives involving intersectional identities that lie beyond the scope of existing approaches. Our analysis provides unified axiomatic foundations and comparative statics for a broad class of distributional policies. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_08035 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Distributional Preferences for Market Design Echenique, Federico Mekonnen, Teddy Yenmez, M. Bumin Theoretical Economics We develop a general framework for incorporating distributional preferences in market design. We identify the structural properties of these preferences that guarantee the path independence of choice rules. In decentralized settings, a greedy rule uniquely maximizes these preferences; in centralized markets, the associated deferred-acceptance mechanism uniquely implements them. This framework subsumes canonical models, such as reserves and matroids, while accommodating complex objectives involving intersectional identities that lie beyond the scope of existing approaches. Our analysis provides unified axiomatic foundations and comparative statics for a broad class of distributional policies. |
| title | Distributional Preferences for Market Design |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.08035 |