Spacetime singularities and incompleteness: epistemic and ontological remarks
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866914315882201088 |
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| author | Romero, Gustavo E. |
| author_facet | Romero, Gustavo E. |
| contents | I argue that spacetime singularities entail no ontological commitment to material entities. First, I show that Penrose's singularity theorem is best understood as a theorem of incompleteness, it demonstrates the failure of specific spacetime models within General Relativity (or any theory incorporating the Raychaudhuri equation) under certain general conditions. Although this has been done before, I adopt a novel approach based on differentiating between physical and purely formal assumptions in the axiomatic foundation of general relativity. Next, I compare Penrose's result with Gödel's incompleteness theorem, highlighting key similarities and differences. Finally, I draw philosophical conclusions regarding the limits and prospects of our epistemic reconstructions of the physical world. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_08931 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Spacetime singularities and incompleteness: epistemic and ontological remarks Romero, Gustavo E. History and Philosophy of Physics General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology I argue that spacetime singularities entail no ontological commitment to material entities. First, I show that Penrose's singularity theorem is best understood as a theorem of incompleteness, it demonstrates the failure of specific spacetime models within General Relativity (or any theory incorporating the Raychaudhuri equation) under certain general conditions. Although this has been done before, I adopt a novel approach based on differentiating between physical and purely formal assumptions in the axiomatic foundation of general relativity. Next, I compare Penrose's result with Gödel's incompleteness theorem, highlighting key similarities and differences. Finally, I draw philosophical conclusions regarding the limits and prospects of our epistemic reconstructions of the physical world. |
| title | Spacetime singularities and incompleteness: epistemic and ontological remarks |
| topic | History and Philosophy of Physics General Relativity and Quantum Cosmology |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.08931 |