Platform Design, Earnings Transparency and Minimum Wage Policies: Evidence from A Natural Experiment on Lyft
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866908824901779456 |
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| author | Li, Rubing Liu, Xiao Sundararajan, Arun |
| author_facet | Li, Rubing Liu, Xiao Sundararajan, Arun |
| contents | We study the effects of a significant design and policy change at a major ridesharing platform that altered both provider earnings and platform transparency, examining how it affected outcomes for drivers, riders, and the platform, and providing managerial insights on balancing competing stakeholder interests while avoiding unintended consequences. In February 2024, Lyft introduced a policy guaranteeing drivers a minimum fraction of rider payments while increasing per-ride earnings transparency. The staggered rollout, first in major markets, created a natural experiment to examine how earnings guarantees and transparency affect ride availability and driver engagement. Using trip-level data from over 47 million rides across a major market and adjacent markets over six months, we apply dynamic staggered difference-in-differences models combined with a geographic border strategy to estimate causal effects on supply, demand, ride production, and platform performance. We find that the policy led to substantial increases in driver engagement, with distinct effects from the guarantee and transparency. Drivers increased working hours and utilization, resulting in more completed trips and higher per-hour and per-trip earnings, with stronger effects among drivers with lower pre-policy earnings and greater income uncertainty. Increased supply also generated positive spillovers on demand. We also find evidence that greater transparency may induce strategic driver behavior. In ongoing work, we develop a counterfactual simulation framework linking driver supply and rider intents to ride production, illustrating how small changes in driver choices could further amplify policy effects. Our study shows how platform-led interventions present an intriguing alternative to government-led minimum pay regulation and provide new strategic insights into managing platform change. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_08955 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Platform Design, Earnings Transparency and Minimum Wage Policies: Evidence from A Natural Experiment on Lyft Li, Rubing Liu, Xiao Sundararajan, Arun General Economics Economics We study the effects of a significant design and policy change at a major ridesharing platform that altered both provider earnings and platform transparency, examining how it affected outcomes for drivers, riders, and the platform, and providing managerial insights on balancing competing stakeholder interests while avoiding unintended consequences. In February 2024, Lyft introduced a policy guaranteeing drivers a minimum fraction of rider payments while increasing per-ride earnings transparency. The staggered rollout, first in major markets, created a natural experiment to examine how earnings guarantees and transparency affect ride availability and driver engagement. Using trip-level data from over 47 million rides across a major market and adjacent markets over six months, we apply dynamic staggered difference-in-differences models combined with a geographic border strategy to estimate causal effects on supply, demand, ride production, and platform performance. We find that the policy led to substantial increases in driver engagement, with distinct effects from the guarantee and transparency. Drivers increased working hours and utilization, resulting in more completed trips and higher per-hour and per-trip earnings, with stronger effects among drivers with lower pre-policy earnings and greater income uncertainty. Increased supply also generated positive spillovers on demand. We also find evidence that greater transparency may induce strategic driver behavior. In ongoing work, we develop a counterfactual simulation framework linking driver supply and rider intents to ride production, illustrating how small changes in driver choices could further amplify policy effects. Our study shows how platform-led interventions present an intriguing alternative to government-led minimum pay regulation and provide new strategic insights into managing platform change. |
| title | Platform Design, Earnings Transparency and Minimum Wage Policies: Evidence from A Natural Experiment on Lyft |
| topic | General Economics Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.08955 |