Affirmative Action in India with Hierarchical Reservations
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arXiv
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866914336012763136 |
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| author | Aygün, Orhan Turhan, Bertan |
| author_facet | Aygün, Orhan Turhan, Bertan |
| contents | India implements the world's most complex affirmative action program through vertical and horizontal reservations. Although applicants can belong to at most one vertical category, they can qualify for multiple horizontal reservation categories simultaneously. We examine resource allocation problems in India, where horizontal reservations follow a hierarchical structure within a one-to-all horizontal matching framework. We introduce the hierarchical choice rule and show that it selects the most meritorious set of applicants. We thoroughly analyze the properties of the aggregate choice rule, which comprises hierarchical choice rules across all vertical categories. We show that the generalized deferred acceptance mechanism, when coupled with this aggregate choice rule, is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism that eliminates justified envy. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_09189 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Affirmative Action in India with Hierarchical Reservations Aygün, Orhan Turhan, Bertan Theoretical Economics India implements the world's most complex affirmative action program through vertical and horizontal reservations. Although applicants can belong to at most one vertical category, they can qualify for multiple horizontal reservation categories simultaneously. We examine resource allocation problems in India, where horizontal reservations follow a hierarchical structure within a one-to-all horizontal matching framework. We introduce the hierarchical choice rule and show that it selects the most meritorious set of applicants. We thoroughly analyze the properties of the aggregate choice rule, which comprises hierarchical choice rules across all vertical categories. We show that the generalized deferred acceptance mechanism, when coupled with this aggregate choice rule, is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism that eliminates justified envy. |
| title | Affirmative Action in India with Hierarchical Reservations |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.09189 |