Selective Disclosure in Overlapping Generations
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arXiv
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Published: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866912925237641216 |
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| author | Antic, Nemanja Pei, Harry |
| author_facet | Antic, Nemanja Pei, Harry |
| contents | We develop an overlapping generations model where each agent observes a verifiable private signal about the state and, with positive probability, also receives signals disclosed by his predecessor. The agent then takes an action and decides which signals to pass on. Each agent's action has a positive externality on his predecessor and his optimal action increases in his belief about the state. We show that as the probability that messages reach the next generation approaches one, agents become increasingly selective in disclosing information. In the limit, all signals except for the most favorable ones will be concealed. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_09406 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Selective Disclosure in Overlapping Generations Antic, Nemanja Pei, Harry Theoretical Economics We develop an overlapping generations model where each agent observes a verifiable private signal about the state and, with positive probability, also receives signals disclosed by his predecessor. The agent then takes an action and decides which signals to pass on. Each agent's action has a positive externality on his predecessor and his optimal action increases in his belief about the state. We show that as the probability that messages reach the next generation approaches one, agents become increasingly selective in disclosing information. In the limit, all signals except for the most favorable ones will be concealed. |
| title | Selective Disclosure in Overlapping Generations |
| topic | Theoretical Economics |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.09406 |