Symmetric preferences, asymmetric outcomes: Tipping dynamics in an open-city segregation model

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: van Dissel, Fabio, Pham, Tuan Minh, Merbis, Wout
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2026
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author van Dissel, Fabio
Pham, Tuan Minh
Merbis, Wout
author_facet van Dissel, Fabio
Pham, Tuan Minh
Merbis, Wout
contents Schelling's model of segregation demonstrates that even in the absence of social or governmental interventions, individuals with mild in-group preferences can self-organize into strongly segregated neighborhoods. Many variants of this celebrated model have been proposed by assuming agents tend to increase their satisfaction. Complementary to this traditional, utility-based approach, we model residential moves using satisfaction-independent reaction rates in a spatially extended chemical reaction network. The resulting model exhibits a counter-intuitive phenomenon: despite symmetric in-group preferences, the system undergoes a tipping transition at a critical preference level, beyond which one agent type dominates. We characterize this asymmetric phase transition in details using mean-field analysis, numerical simulations and finite size scaling methods. We find that while the transition shares key features with the Ising universality class, such as $\mathbb{Z}_2$ symmetry breaking and similar exponent ratios, the full set of critical exponents does not match any known universality class.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_09795
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Symmetric preferences, asymmetric outcomes: Tipping dynamics in an open-city segregation model
van Dissel, Fabio
Pham, Tuan Minh
Merbis, Wout
Physics and Society
Statistical Mechanics
Schelling's model of segregation demonstrates that even in the absence of social or governmental interventions, individuals with mild in-group preferences can self-organize into strongly segregated neighborhoods. Many variants of this celebrated model have been proposed by assuming agents tend to increase their satisfaction. Complementary to this traditional, utility-based approach, we model residential moves using satisfaction-independent reaction rates in a spatially extended chemical reaction network. The resulting model exhibits a counter-intuitive phenomenon: despite symmetric in-group preferences, the system undergoes a tipping transition at a critical preference level, beyond which one agent type dominates. We characterize this asymmetric phase transition in details using mean-field analysis, numerical simulations and finite size scaling methods. We find that while the transition shares key features with the Ising universality class, such as $\mathbb{Z}_2$ symmetry breaking and similar exponent ratios, the full set of critical exponents does not match any known universality class.
title Symmetric preferences, asymmetric outcomes: Tipping dynamics in an open-city segregation model
topic Physics and Society
Statistical Mechanics
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.09795