Red-teaming the Multimodal Reasoning: Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models via Cross-modal Entanglement Attacks

Fuente: arXiv
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Main Authors: Yan, Yu, Sun, Sheng, Cheng, Shengjia, Liu, Teli, Li, Mingfeng, Liu, Min
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
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_version_ 1866914321062166528
author Yan, Yu
Sun, Sheng
Cheng, Shengjia
Liu, Teli
Li, Mingfeng
Liu, Min
author_facet Yan, Yu
Sun, Sheng
Cheng, Shengjia
Liu, Teli
Li, Mingfeng
Liu, Min
contents Vision-Language Models (VLMs) with multimodal reasoning capabilities are high-value attack targets, given their potential for handling complex multimodal harmful tasks. Mainstream black-box jailbreak attacks on VLMs work by distributing malicious clues across modalities to disperse model attention and bypass safety alignment mechanisms. However, these adversarial attacks rely on simple and fixed image-text combinations that lack attack complexity scalability, limiting their effectiveness for red-teaming VLMs' continuously evolving reasoning capabilities. We propose \textbf{CrossTALK} (\textbf{\underline{Cross}}-modal en\textbf{\underline{TA}}ng\textbf{\underline{L}}ement attac\textbf{\underline{K}}), which is a scalable approach that extends and entangles information clues across modalities to exceed VLMs' trained and generalized safety alignment patterns for jailbreak. Specifically, {knowledge-scalable reframing} extends harmful tasks into multi-hop chain instructions, {cross-modal clue entangling} migrates visualizable entities into images to build multimodal reasoning links, and {cross-modal scenario nesting} uses multimodal contextual instructions to steer VLMs toward detailed harmful outputs. Experiments show our COMET achieves state-of-the-art attack success rate.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_10148
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Red-teaming the Multimodal Reasoning: Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models via Cross-modal Entanglement Attacks
Yan, Yu
Sun, Sheng
Cheng, Shengjia
Liu, Teli
Li, Mingfeng
Liu, Min
Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
Vision-Language Models (VLMs) with multimodal reasoning capabilities are high-value attack targets, given their potential for handling complex multimodal harmful tasks. Mainstream black-box jailbreak attacks on VLMs work by distributing malicious clues across modalities to disperse model attention and bypass safety alignment mechanisms. However, these adversarial attacks rely on simple and fixed image-text combinations that lack attack complexity scalability, limiting their effectiveness for red-teaming VLMs' continuously evolving reasoning capabilities. We propose \textbf{CrossTALK} (\textbf{\underline{Cross}}-modal en\textbf{\underline{TA}}ng\textbf{\underline{L}}ement attac\textbf{\underline{K}}), which is a scalable approach that extends and entangles information clues across modalities to exceed VLMs' trained and generalized safety alignment patterns for jailbreak. Specifically, {knowledge-scalable reframing} extends harmful tasks into multi-hop chain instructions, {cross-modal clue entangling} migrates visualizable entities into images to build multimodal reasoning links, and {cross-modal scenario nesting} uses multimodal contextual instructions to steer VLMs toward detailed harmful outputs. Experiments show our COMET achieves state-of-the-art attack success rate.
title Red-teaming the Multimodal Reasoning: Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models via Cross-modal Entanglement Attacks
topic Cryptography and Security
Artificial Intelligence
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.10148