MerkleSpeech: Public-Key Verifiable, Chunk-Localised Speech Provenance via Perceptual Fingerprints and Merkle Commitments
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arXiv
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| Natura: | Preprint |
| Pubblicazione: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866912895939379200 |
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| author | Ono, Tatsunori |
| author_facet | Ono, Tatsunori |
| contents | Speech provenance goes beyond detecting whether a watermark is present. Real workflows involve splicing, quoting, trimming, and platform-level transforms that may preserve some regions while altering others. Neural watermarking systems have made strides in robustness and localised detection, but most deployments produce outputs with no third-party verifiable cryptographic proof tying a time segment to an issuer-signed original. Provenance standards like C2PA adopt signed manifests and Merkle-based fragment validation, yet their bindings target encoded assets and break under re-encoding or routine processing.
We propose MerkleSpeech, a system for public-key verifiable, chunk-localised speech provenance offering two tiers of assurance. The first, a robust watermark attribution layer (WM-only), survives common distribution transforms and answers "was this chunk issued by a known party?". The second, a strict cryptographic integrity layer (MSv1), verifies Merkle inclusion of the chunk's fingerprint under an issuer signature. The system computes perceptual fingerprints over short speech chunks, commits them in a Merkle tree whose root is signed with an issuer key, and embeds a compact in-band watermark payload carrying a random content identifier and chunk metadata sufficient to retrieve Merkle inclusion proofs from a repository. Once the payload is extracted, all subsequent verification steps (signature check, fingerprint recomputation, Merkle inclusion) use only public information. The result is a splice-aware timeline indicating which regions pass each tier and why any given region fails. We describe the protocol, provide pseudocode, and present experiments targeting very low false positive rates under resampling, bandpass filtering, and additive noise, informed by recent audits identifying neural codecs as a major stressor for post-hoc audio watermarks. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_10166 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | MerkleSpeech: Public-Key Verifiable, Chunk-Localised Speech Provenance via Perceptual Fingerprints and Merkle Commitments Ono, Tatsunori Cryptography and Security Sound Audio and Speech Processing Speech provenance goes beyond detecting whether a watermark is present. Real workflows involve splicing, quoting, trimming, and platform-level transforms that may preserve some regions while altering others. Neural watermarking systems have made strides in robustness and localised detection, but most deployments produce outputs with no third-party verifiable cryptographic proof tying a time segment to an issuer-signed original. Provenance standards like C2PA adopt signed manifests and Merkle-based fragment validation, yet their bindings target encoded assets and break under re-encoding or routine processing. We propose MerkleSpeech, a system for public-key verifiable, chunk-localised speech provenance offering two tiers of assurance. The first, a robust watermark attribution layer (WM-only), survives common distribution transforms and answers "was this chunk issued by a known party?". The second, a strict cryptographic integrity layer (MSv1), verifies Merkle inclusion of the chunk's fingerprint under an issuer signature. The system computes perceptual fingerprints over short speech chunks, commits them in a Merkle tree whose root is signed with an issuer key, and embeds a compact in-band watermark payload carrying a random content identifier and chunk metadata sufficient to retrieve Merkle inclusion proofs from a repository. Once the payload is extracted, all subsequent verification steps (signature check, fingerprint recomputation, Merkle inclusion) use only public information. The result is a splice-aware timeline indicating which regions pass each tier and why any given region fails. We describe the protocol, provide pseudocode, and present experiments targeting very low false positive rates under resampling, bandpass filtering, and additive noise, informed by recent audits identifying neural codecs as a major stressor for post-hoc audio watermarks. |
| title | MerkleSpeech: Public-Key Verifiable, Chunk-Localised Speech Provenance via Perceptual Fingerprints and Merkle Commitments |
| topic | Cryptography and Security Sound Audio and Speech Processing |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.10166 |