Metric geometry for ranking-based voting: Tools for learning electoral structure
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arXiv
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| Auteurs principaux: | , |
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| Format: | Preprint |
| Publié: |
2026
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| _version_ | 1866918331918843904 |
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| author | Duchin, Moon Tapp, Kristopher |
| author_facet | Duchin, Moon Tapp, Kristopher |
| contents | In this paper, we develop the metric geometry of ranking statistics, proving that the two major permutation distances in the statistics literature -- Kendall tau and Spearman footrule -- extend naturally to incomplete rankings with both coordinate embeddings and graph realizations. This gives us a unifying framework that allows us to connect popular topics in computational social choice: metric preferences (and metric distortion), polarization, and proportionality.
As an important application, the metric structure enables efficient identification of blocs of voters and slates of their preferred candidates. Since the definitions work for partial ballots, we can execute the methods not only on synthetic elections, but on a suite of real-world elections. This gives us robust clustering methods that often produce an identical grouping of voters -- even though one family of methods is based on a Condorcet-consistent ranking rule while the other is not. |
| format | Preprint |
| id |
arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_10293 |
| institution | arXiv |
| publishDate | 2026 |
| record_format | arxiv |
| spellingShingle | Metric geometry for ranking-based voting: Tools for learning electoral structure Duchin, Moon Tapp, Kristopher Metric Geometry Computers and Society Theoretical Economics Combinatorics 05C12 (Primary) 91B12, 91B14 (Secondary) In this paper, we develop the metric geometry of ranking statistics, proving that the two major permutation distances in the statistics literature -- Kendall tau and Spearman footrule -- extend naturally to incomplete rankings with both coordinate embeddings and graph realizations. This gives us a unifying framework that allows us to connect popular topics in computational social choice: metric preferences (and metric distortion), polarization, and proportionality. As an important application, the metric structure enables efficient identification of blocs of voters and slates of their preferred candidates. Since the definitions work for partial ballots, we can execute the methods not only on synthetic elections, but on a suite of real-world elections. This gives us robust clustering methods that often produce an identical grouping of voters -- even though one family of methods is based on a Condorcet-consistent ranking rule while the other is not. |
| title | Metric geometry for ranking-based voting: Tools for learning electoral structure |
| topic | Metric Geometry Computers and Society Theoretical Economics Combinatorics 05C12 (Primary) 91B12, 91B14 (Secondary) |
| url | https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.10293 |