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Metric geometry for ranking-based voting: Tools for learning electoral structure

Fuente: arXiv

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Duchin, Moon, Tapp, Kristopher
Formato:	Preprint
Publicado:	2026
Materias:	Metric Geometry Computers and Society Theoretical Economics Combinatorics 05C12 (Primary) 91B12, 91B14 (Secondary)
Acceso en línea:	Acceder al recurso
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

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