Triggers Hijack Language Circuits: A Mechanistic Analysis of Backdoor Behaviors in Large Language Models

Fuente: arXiv
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Auteurs principaux: Lasnier, Théo, Antoun, Wissam, Kulumba, Francis, Seddah, Djamé
Format: Preprint
Publié: 2026
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author Lasnier, Théo
Antoun, Wissam
Kulumba, Francis
Seddah, Djamé
author_facet Lasnier, Théo
Antoun, Wissam
Kulumba, Francis
Seddah, Djamé
contents Backdoor attacks pose significant security risks for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet the internal mechanisms by which triggers operate remain poorly understood. We present the first mechanistic analysis of language-switching backdoors, studying the GAPperon model family (1B, 8B, 24B parameters) which contains triggers injected during pretraining that cause output language switching. Using activation patching, we localize trigger formation to early layers (7.5-25% of model depth) and identify which attention heads process trigger information. Our central finding is that trigger-activated heads substantially overlap with heads naturally encoding output language across model scales, with Jaccard indices between 0.18 and 0.66 over the top heads identified. This suggests that backdoor triggers do not form isolated circuits but instead co-opt the model's existing language components. These findings have implications for backdoor defense: detection methods may benefit from monitoring known functional components rather than searching for hidden circuits, and mitigation strategies could potentially leverage this entanglement between injected and natural behaviors.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_10382
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Triggers Hijack Language Circuits: A Mechanistic Analysis of Backdoor Behaviors in Large Language Models
Lasnier, Théo
Antoun, Wissam
Kulumba, Francis
Seddah, Djamé
Computation and Language
Backdoor attacks pose significant security risks for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet the internal mechanisms by which triggers operate remain poorly understood. We present the first mechanistic analysis of language-switching backdoors, studying the GAPperon model family (1B, 8B, 24B parameters) which contains triggers injected during pretraining that cause output language switching. Using activation patching, we localize trigger formation to early layers (7.5-25% of model depth) and identify which attention heads process trigger information. Our central finding is that trigger-activated heads substantially overlap with heads naturally encoding output language across model scales, with Jaccard indices between 0.18 and 0.66 over the top heads identified. This suggests that backdoor triggers do not form isolated circuits but instead co-opt the model's existing language components. These findings have implications for backdoor defense: detection methods may benefit from monitoring known functional components rather than searching for hidden circuits, and mitigation strategies could potentially leverage this entanglement between injected and natural behaviors.
title Triggers Hijack Language Circuits: A Mechanistic Analysis of Backdoor Behaviors in Large Language Models
topic Computation and Language
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.10382