Equity by Design: Fairness-Driven Recommendation in Heterogeneous Two-Sided Markets

Fuente: arXiv
Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Seputis, Dominykas, Timans, Alexander, Verma, Rajeev
Format: Preprint
Published: 2026
Subjects:
Online Access:
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
_version_ 1866912900121100288
author Seputis, Dominykas
Timans, Alexander
Verma, Rajeev
author_facet Seputis, Dominykas
Timans, Alexander
Verma, Rajeev
contents Two-sided marketplaces embody heterogeneity in incentives: producers seek exposure while consumers seek relevance, and balancing these competing objectives through constrained optimization is now a standard practice. Yet real platforms face finer-grained complexity: consumers differ in preferences and engagement patterns, producers vary in catalog value and capacity, and business objectives impose additional constraints beyond raw relevance. We formalize two-sided fairness under these realistic conditions, extending prior work from soft single-item allocations to discrete multi-item recommendations. We introduce Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) as a consumer-side objective that compresses group-level utility disparities, and integrate business constraints directly into the optimization. Our experiments reveal that the "free fairness" regime, where producer constraints impose no consumer cost, disappears in multi item settings. Strikingly, moderate fairness constraints can improve business metrics by diversifying exposure away from saturated producers. Scalable solvers match exact solutions at a fraction of the runtime, making fairness-aware allocation practical at scale. These findings reframe fairness not as a tax on platform efficiency but as a lever for sustainable marketplace health.
format Preprint
id arxiv_https___arxiv_org_abs_2602_10739
institution arXiv
publishDate 2026
record_format arxiv
spellingShingle Equity by Design: Fairness-Driven Recommendation in Heterogeneous Two-Sided Markets
Seputis, Dominykas
Timans, Alexander
Verma, Rajeev
Computer Science and Game Theory
Information Retrieval
Two-sided marketplaces embody heterogeneity in incentives: producers seek exposure while consumers seek relevance, and balancing these competing objectives through constrained optimization is now a standard practice. Yet real platforms face finer-grained complexity: consumers differ in preferences and engagement patterns, producers vary in catalog value and capacity, and business objectives impose additional constraints beyond raw relevance. We formalize two-sided fairness under these realistic conditions, extending prior work from soft single-item allocations to discrete multi-item recommendations. We introduce Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) as a consumer-side objective that compresses group-level utility disparities, and integrate business constraints directly into the optimization. Our experiments reveal that the "free fairness" regime, where producer constraints impose no consumer cost, disappears in multi item settings. Strikingly, moderate fairness constraints can improve business metrics by diversifying exposure away from saturated producers. Scalable solvers match exact solutions at a fraction of the runtime, making fairness-aware allocation practical at scale. These findings reframe fairness not as a tax on platform efficiency but as a lever for sustainable marketplace health.
title Equity by Design: Fairness-Driven Recommendation in Heterogeneous Two-Sided Markets
topic Computer Science and Game Theory
Information Retrieval
url https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.10739